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TRADEMARK LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAW—DECEPTION IS A CRUEL ACT1: “UNIFORM” STATE DECEP­
TIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACTS AND THEIR DECEPTIVE EFFECTS ON 
THE TRADEMARK CLAIMS OF CORPORATE COMPETITORS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Lanham Trademark Act,2 enacted in 1946, was created to 
protect and regulate commerce through the registration of trade­
marks for goods and services.3  Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), sec­
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act addresses the deceptive use of 
protected trademarks via means of false advertising and other un­
fair trade practices.4  Courts have generally held that in order to 
have standing to bring suit under section 43(a), plaintiffs must be 
competitors in the marketplace.5  Since the stated purpose of the 
Lanham Act is the protection of commercial interests, common 
consumers are not typically afforded standing to bring claims under 
section 43(a), because they have none.6 
Complaints of false advertising and unfair trade practices made 
under the Lanham Act often give rise to state-law claims of decep­
tive trade practices born of the same infringement.7  Modeled after 
both the Federal Trade Commission Act8 (“FTCA”) and the Uni­
1. “Deception is a cruel act. . . . It often has many players on different stages that 
corrode the soul.”  Donna A. Favors, Member of the Bd. of Directors of the Montgom­
ery Institute (1955), available at http://thinkexist.com/quotation/deception_is_a_cruel_ 
act-it_often_has_many/250933.html. 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141n (2006). 
3. Travis Ketterman, Lanham Act Does Not Cover Consumer Claims, 7 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REP. 31, 38 (1994). 
4. James S. Wrona, False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act: Broad Consumer Protection Legislation or a Narrow Pro-Competi­
tive Measure?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1091-92 (1995). 
5. Brian Morris, Consumer Standing to Sue for False and Misleading Advertising 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 417, 418 
(1987). 
6. See, e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993); Colli­
gan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971). 
7. See Marcia B. Paul, Basic Principles of Section 43(a) and Unfair Competition, 
in PRACTISING  LAW  INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND  LITERARY  PROPERTY 
COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 81, 98 (1995), available at 419 PLI/PAT 81 (Westlaw). 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 41-58 (2006). 
549 
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form Deceptive Trade Practices Act9 (“UDTPA”), deceptive trade 
practices acts (“DTPA”) seek to prevent consumer fraud and de­
ception.  These statutes make actionable the “pass[ing] off [of] 
goods or services as those of another or caus[ing] confusion regard­
ing the source of sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or 
services”10 and are often replete with desirable promises of en­
hanced attorneys’ fees and treble damages awards.  When the 
DTPAs were first adopted by the states, many of these statutes dic­
tated that only the State Attorney General could bring suit on be­
half of private individuals.11  But with the passing of time, private 
rights of action were recognized under the DTPAs.12  This recogni­
tion, however, gave rise to a new debate among the states—should 
the private right of action be extended to corporate competitors or 
restricted solely to individual consumers? 
While some states have afforded standing to corporate compet­
itors under the DTPAs, albeit with restrictions,13 other states have 
precluded corporate competitors from making claims under the 
DTPAs.14  Further still, some states have limited the private right of 
9. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 
7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/ 
1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
10. John L. Reed, Lanham Act and Deceptive Trade Practice Claims Arising 
Under State Professional Licensure Laws, 8 FORDHAM  INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 223, 259 (1997). 
11. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 486 (1967). 
12. Id. 
13. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-110b (West 2007) (requiring proof of 
ascertainable loss); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 2, 11 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 358-A:2 (2009) (requiring analysis of nature of transaction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 
(West 2001) (requiring proof of ascertainable loss); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKin­
ney 2004) (requiring actual harm to the public); Trent Partners & Assocs., Inc. v. Digital 
Equip. Corp., 120 F. Supp. 2d 84, 106 (D. Mass. 1999) (requiring proof of “rascality”); 
see also ABA COMM. ON BUS. & CORPORATE LITIG., ANNUAL REVIEW OF DEVELOP­
MENTS IN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LITIGATION § 6.3, at 204 (2005). 
14. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1212 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 201-3, -9.2 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-2, -5, -5.2 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 9, §§ 2453, 2461(b) (2006); Scully Signal Co. v. Joyal, 881 F. Supp. 727, 741 (D.R.I. 
1995) (“The Rhode Island Act only provides private rights of action to the Attorney 
General and to ‘person[s] who purchase or lease goods or services primarily for per­
sonal, family, or household purposes. . . .’” (citation omitted)); Permagrain Prods., Inc. 
v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[The Pennsylvania] 
act limits private suits to goods purchased by consumers for their personal use”); see 
also ABA COMM. ON BUS. & CORPORATE LITIG., supra note 13, § 6.3, at 204. R 
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action under the DTPAs solely to corporate competitors.15  The dis­
crepancy present in the interpretation of the DTPAs has left many 
corporate plaintiffs, who often do business in more than one state, 
without any legal remedy for trademark infringement under these 
state DTPAs.  Not only are corporate competitors unable to fully 
litigate their claims in a court of law, but they are also denied the 
possibility of receiving the treble damages and attorneys’ fees, 
which the vast majority of the DTPAs offer as relief.16 
This discrepancy in the law is particularly problematic when 
corporate plaintiffs attach deceptive-trade-practices allegations to 
section 43(a) Lanham Act claims, primarily because, under the 
Lanham Act, only corporate competitors have standing to bring 
suit.17  Corporate competitors’ rights are especially frustrated in the 
northeastern United States due to the geographic proximity of its 
small, clustered states.  Because these states are so close together, 
corporate competitors are wont to engage in business in many of 
them.  This is problematic because a trademark-related claim aris­
ing out of a defendant’s deceptive trade practice that is actionable 
in one state is not similarly actionable in another. 
This Note will explore the legal history and ramifications of the 
DTPAs of representative states of the First, Second, and Third Cir­
cuits upon section 43(a) Lanham Act claims between corporate 
competitors.  This analysis suggests that the states of the First, Sec­
ond, and Third Circuits must reform their DTPAs through the 
adoption of a uniform act to allow for cohesion in the Northeast of 
available remedies to corporate competitors. 
Part I of this Note will detail the history and purpose of the 
Lanham Act (the “Act”), including the scope of the Act itself and 
how it applies to and affects corporations.  Part II will examine the 
evolution of the state DTPAs from the early days of the FTCA, to 
15. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532 (2005); Wald v. Wilmington Trust Co., 
552 A.2d 853, 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) (“The statute is meant to provide a remedy for 
injuries to business interests, rather than for harm to individual consumers.”). 
16. Dole, supra note 11, at 495.  Although injunctive relief is the primary function R 
of the UDTPA, reasonable attorneys’ fees and treble damages are awarded at the dis­
cretion of the court. Id.  The states’ failure to correct the discrepancy between the 
existing DTPAs serves as a deterrent to corporate competitors seeking to fully recover 
upon their claims.  Under the section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, attorneys’ fees are 
awarded only in “exceptional cases.”  Reed, supra note 10, at 258. R 
17. See Morris, supra note 5, at 417. R 
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the development of the UDTPA,18 and finally to the formation of 
the “Little FTC Acts.”19  Part III will then discuss the DTPAs and 
their application to corporate competitors. 
Part IV of this Note will provide the recommendation that, to 
redress the discrepancies present in the DTPAs, it is necessary to 
devise new requirements for corporate competitors to be afforded 
standing under these acts.  In contrast to Rhode Island20 and Penn­
sylvania’s21 strict rule of law prohibiting corporate competitor 
claims and Delaware’s act22 allowing only corporate competitors to 
bring claims, the states of the Northeast ought to blend the treat­
ments of the law by states within the First, Second, and Third Cir­
cuits to adopt a true uniform law.  To achieve this goal, clear 
guidelines as to standing requirements for corporate competitors 
under the DTPAs must be formed.23  Further, the states must estab­
lish revised terms for what a competitor-plaintiff must prove in or­
der to succeed on his claim.24  Lastly, the states must craft a final, 
concise definition of what constitutes a “deceptive trade practice.”25 
If such a uniform system were implemented, corporations in the 
Northeast would be able to operate with greater efficiency and 
without fear of being unable to litigate their valid claims in a court 
of law. 
I. THE LANHAM TRADEMARK ACT 
The evolution of the Lanham Trademark Act has shaped the 
protection of trademarks in our country.  To a large extent, judi­
cially rendered standing requirements have determined who can, 
18. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 
7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/ 
1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
19. Each of the fifty states has crafted its own version of the Federal Trade Com­
mission Act in the form of statutes dubbed “Little FTC Acts,” which are used as mech­
anisms to deter deceptive trade practices.  Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive 
Trade Practices Under “Little FTC Acts”: Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 DICK. 
L. REV. 373, 375-76 (1990). 
20. R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§ 6-13.1-2, -5 (2001); Scully Signal Co. v. Joyal, 881 F. Supp. 
727, 741 (D.R.I. 1995). 
21. Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 201-3 (West 2008); Permagrain Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Mat 
& Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1980). 
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532 (2005); Wald v. Wilmington Trust Co., 552 A.2d 
853, 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988). 
23. See infra notes 220-231 and accompanying text. R 
24. See infra notes 232-275 and accompanying text. R 
25. See infra notes 276-288 and accompanying text. R 
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and who cannot, bring suit under the Lanham Act.26  Importantly, 
the courts have decided that only corporate competitors may be af­
forded this right.27  Ordinarily this is not a problem.  However, 
these standing requirements may become hazardous to a competi­
tor-plaintiff’s suit if a DTPA claim arises, despite the fact that these 
claims are born of the same infringement that sparked Lanham in­
tervention in the first place. 
A.	 Lanham’s Purpose: Trademark Infringement, Trademark 
Dilution, and False Advertising Claims 
In lay terms, a trademark is a sign or logo that is affixed to a 
product or service to signal ownership of the goods as well as a legal 
right to exclusive use by the owner of the mark.28 Black’s Law Dic­
tionary defines a trademark as a “commercial substitute for one’s 
signature.”29  The essential commercial purpose of a trademark is to 
guarantee, sell, and advertise the product or service to which it is 
attached.30  The critical element of every trademark is that it must 
“identify and distinguish” one company’s products from an­
other’s.31  In order to receive federal protection, trademarks must 
have the following five attributes: (1) affixation;32 (2) use;33 (3) dis­
26. See Kevin M. Lemley, Resolving the Circuit Split on Standing in False Adver­
tising Claims and Incorporation of Prudential Standing in State Deceptive Trade Prac­
tices Law: The Quest for Optimal Levels of Accurate Information in the Marketplace, 29 
U. ARK. LITTLE  ROCK L. REV. 283, 296 (2007) (“[P]rudential standing requirements 
remain[ ] constant in that a competitive injury and some degree of competition [is] re­
quired to have standing for a section 43(a) false advertising claim.”); see also infra note 
50 and accompanying text. R 
27. See infra notes 48-64 and accompanying text.	 R 
28. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1325 (11th ed. 2005). 
29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (9th ed. 2009). 
30. 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 17:1, at 17-9 (4th ed. 2009). 
31. SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 1:1:1, at 
1-2 (4th ed. 2006). 
32. Trademarks must be “affixed” to a product such that the product or service is 
immediately recognizable by the consumer in the marketplace. INTELLECTUAL  PROP­
ERTY FOR THE INTERNET § 1.12, at 1-12 (Lewis C. Lee & J. Scott Davidson eds., 1997). 
33. Companies must use or have an intent to use the trademark within interstate 
commerce in order for federal protection to be granted. Id. 
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tinctiveness;34 (4) lack of similarity to other marks;35 and (5) 
nonfunctionality.36 
The Lanham Act, created in 1946 to replace the Trade-Mark 
Act of 1920,37 was passed specifically to address infringement,38 di-
lution,39 and false advertising claims.40  The Lanham Act’s purpose 
is clear, providing, in relevant part, that “[t]he intent of this [Act] is 
34. “A distinctive mark is one that is unique or nonordinary.” Id.  There are five 
categories of distinctiveness in the trademark arena—those that are fanciful, arbitrary, 
suggestive, descriptive, and generic. Id. § 1.12, at 13.  While some trademarks are in­
herently distinctive (fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive) and may be registered immedi­
ately, others are not (descriptive and generic) and must acquire secondary meaning in 
the marketplace before becoming registrable. Id. 
35. Federal “[t]rademark protection will not be given to a mark that is likely to 
cause confusion with another registered mark.” Id.  In examining this standard, trade­
mark examiners will consider the similarity of the marks with respect to 
appearance, sound, connotation, . . . impression[,] . . . [the] nature of the prod­
ucts or services[,] . . . [the] established trade channels for the products or ser­
vices[,] . . . [the] conditions of the sale (impulse purchase versus sophisticated 
purchase)[,] . . . [the] fame of the prior mark[,] . . . [the] number and nature of 
similar marks in use on similar products or services[,] . . . [the] nature and 
extent of any actual confusion[,] . . . [and the] variety of products and services 
with which the mark is used. 
Id. § 1.12, at 13-14. 
36. The nonfunctionality requirement states that trademark protection is not usu­
ally available for functional or utilitarian purposes or features of a product. Id. § 1.12, 
at 14. 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141n (2006); see Theresa E. McEvilly, Virtual Advertising in 
Sports Venues and the Federal Lanham Act § 43(a): Revolutionary Technology Creates 
Controversial Advertising Medium, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 603, 616-17 (1998). 
38. Trademark infringement is “[t]he unauthorized use of a trademark—or of a 
confusingly similar name, word, symbol, or any combination of these—in connection 
with the same or related goods or services and in a manner that is likely to cause confu­
sion, deception, or mistake about the source of the goods or services.” BLACK’S  LAW 
DICTIONARY 852 (9th ed. 2009). 
39. As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, trademark dilution is “[t]he impair­
ment of a famous trademark’s strength, effectiveness, or distinctiveness through the use 
of the mark on an unrelated product, usu[ally] blurring the trademark’s distinctive char­
acter or tarnishing it with an unsavory association.” Id. at 524.  To recover for trade­
mark dilution, a plaintiff must prove ownership of a famous mark and actual dilution of 
that mark.  Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003). 
40. A statement of advertisement “that tends to [deceive or] mislead consumers 
about the characteristics, quality, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or com­
mercial activity” is considered false advertising under the Lanham Act. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 677 (9th ed. 2009).  False advertising need not be false but only misleading 
in a material way.  15 U.S.C. § 55(a).  To succeed in a false advertising case, a plaintiff 
must prove generally the following elements: 
1. . . . [A] false or misleading description or representation of fact in commer­
cial advertising or promotion [has been made]; 2. That description or represen­
tation actually deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment 
of the intended audience; 3. Such deception is material to consumers in that it 
is likely to influence the purchasing decision; 4. The false advertiser caused its 
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to . . . mak[e] actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks 
. . . ; to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair 
competition; [and] to prevent fraud and deception . . . by the use of 
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of regis­
tered marks.”41  In order to effectuate this broad purpose, Congress 
included a section in the Act that focused upon consumer protec­
tion from misuses of trademarks. 
B. Section 43(a) and Its Effect on Consumers and Corporations 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, in effect, created a federal 
remedial statute dealing with consumer protection issues, while at 
the same time encompassing unfair competition claims.42  As origi­
nally enacted, section 43(a) of the 1946 Lanham Act dealt solely 
with claims relating to false designation of origin.43  This narrow 
language created confusion within the court system as to the Lan­
ham Act’s stance on false advertising, primarily because the Act’s 
legislative history was unclear as to whether section 43(a) ought to 
carry a broader arsenal “against general misrepresentations in 
advertising.”44 
Congress resolved these issues in 1988 with the passing of the 
Trademark Law Revision Act.45  The Trademark Law Revision Act 
expanded the scope of section 43(a) to include both infringement 
and false advertising claims.46  To be successful in a section 43(a) 
claim, a plaintiff must prove that a business entity’s commercial ad­
vertising venture utilizes materially false statements that deceive, or 
falsely advertised goods or services to enter into interstate commerce; and 5. 
The plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result of such falsities. 
Michael F. Clayton, Handling Unfair Competition and False Advertising Cases, in PRAC­
TISING  LAW  INSTITUTE: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND  LITERARY  PROPERTY  COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 261, 269 (2001), available at 677 PLI/PAT 261 (Westlaw); see Lem­
ley, supra note 26, at 285.  Because of its focus on deceptive trade practices between R 
corporate competitors, this Note will deal primarily with the false advertising and in­
fringement aspects of section 43(a) the Lanham Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
41. Lanham Act of 1946 § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
42. See Paul, supra note 7, at 86. R 
43. The 1946 version of the Lanham Act adopted much of its language from the 
federal statute it replaced—the 1920 Trade-Mark Act.  The 1920 Trade-Mark Act was 
designed such that standing to bring suit was limited to “any person, firm, or corpora­
tion doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin, or in the region in 
which said locality is situated.”  Trade-Mark Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104, § 2, 41 Stat. 
533, 533-34 (repealed 1946); see also McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-17. R 
44. McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-17. R 
45. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935; see 
McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-18. R 
46. See McEvilly, supra note 37, at 616-18. R 
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have the capacity to deceive, a substantial portion of a populace 
through interstate commerce due to the statements’ injurious na­
ture.47  Despite the clarification of the Lanham Act’s reach, the 
question of whether the Act extended its remedies to consumers 
still remained unanswered.48 
On its face, the language of the Lanham Act appears to grant 
consumers the right to bring suit.  In relevant part, section 43(a) 
states that 
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation of original, false or misleading description of fact, or 
false or misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval or his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents 
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
47. Bruce P. Keller, “It Keeps Going and Going and Going”: The Expansion of 
False Advertising Litigation Under the Lanham Act, in PRACTISING  LAW  INSTITUTE: 
COMMERCIAL  LAW AND  PRACTICE  COURSE  HANDBOOK  SERIES 135, 148-49 (1997), 
available at 775 PLI/COMM 135 (Westlaw); see, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (concluding that the “false designation of origin, 
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin . . . of [one’s] goods” is 
actionable under the Lanham Act (omissions in original) (quoting section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post­
secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1996) (asserting that 
misrepresentations made about a plaintiff’s goods are actionable under the Lanham Act 
if four-pronged test is satisfied); Nat’l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 
1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a plaintiff must establish that the requirements of the 
four-pronged test have been met in order to bring suit). 
48. See Richard A. De Sevo, Consumer Standing Under Section 43(a)—An Issue 
Whose Time Has Passed, 88 TRADEMARK  REP. 1, 8 (1998).  Confusion in the courts 
over consumers’ ability to bring suit under the Lanham Act has ensued since the Act’s 
inception in 1946.  Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising 
Under the Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 836 (1999).  The “vast majority” of courts 
choose to deny consumer standing, concluding that the purpose of the Act is “to protect 
primarily competitors rather than consumers.” Id.  These questions of ability to bring 
suit boil down to the federal courts’ adherence to prudential standing limitations, 
“which are ‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’”  Greg­
ory Apgar, Prudential Standing Limitations on Lanham Act False Advertising Claims, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2389, 2394 (2008) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 
(1997)). 
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shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he 
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such an act.49 
Because section 43(a) uses such broad language—allowing 
“any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” to 
bring suit—one might conclude that it was Congress’s intent to ab­
rogate prudential standing requirements.50  In terms of the Lanham 
Act, prudential (or, rather, judicially imposed) standing serves to 
limit the class of plaintiffs to those whom the Act was meant to 
protect.51  Some commentators have asserted that the Lanham Act 
was designed with the “dual goals” of protection for both consum­
ers and competitors.52  Section 45 of the Lanham Act, however, 
states that the Lanham Act’s purpose “is exclusively to protect the 
interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous com­
mercial conduct.”53  Thus, Lanham Act standing requires that a 
plaintiff be a corporate competitor. 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
50. See Apgar, supra note 48, at 2400.  Standing, a right which arises from the R 
Constitution, refers to one’s ability to bring a matter before a court of law.  Peter S. 
Massaro, III, Filtering Through a Mess: A Proposal to Reduce the Confusion Surround­
ing the Requirements for Standing in False Advertising Claims Brought Under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2008).  Prudential 
standing is said to be a “creature[ ] of prudence.”  Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from 
Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance Fail a Constitutional or a Prudential Test of Fed­
eral Standing to Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1169, 1198 (2008).  Prudential stand­
ing requirements are not derived from the Constitution but, rather, are congressionally 
or judicially imposed. Id.  Unless a statute states otherwise, prudential standing re­
quirements are automatically assumed by the courts presiding over federal litigation. 
Diane Taing, Comment, Competition for Standing: Defining the Commercial Plaintiff 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 493, 497 (2009).  The­
ories of prudential standing typically refer to three distinct categories: 
the rule against allowing a party to assert a generalized grievance; the rule
 
against ordinarily allowing a party to assert the rights of others; and the rule
 
that a party be arguably within the zone of interest of the statutory or constitu­
tional provision the party raises in support of its position.
 
Stern, supra, at 1199.  In section 43(a) claims, the courts have generally subscribed to 
the rule concerning the parties’ “zone of interest.”  Gerald P. Meyer, Standing Out: A 
Commonsense Approach to Standing for False Advertising Suits Under Lanham Act Sec­
tion 43(a), 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 318 (2009).  This form of prudential standing is 
meant to “limit the class eligible to bring suit under Section 43(a) to those who Con­
gress intended to protect.”  Massaro, supra, at 1679-80.  As this Note asserts, Congress 
meant only to protect corporate competitors under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
51. Massaro, supra note 50, at 1679-80. R 
52. See Tawnya Wojciechowski, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Ar­
gument for Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing for False Advertising 
Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 SW. U. L. REV. 213, 223 (1994). 
53. George Russell Thill, The 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act: Damage 
Awards for False Advertising and Consumer Standing Under Section 43 (a)—Congress 
Drops the Ball Twice, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 361, 377 (1994) (quoting Colligan v. Activi­
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In 1954, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set the standard 
for prudential standing in section 43(a) cases in L’Aiglon Apparel v. 
Lana Lobell, Inc., which held that corporate competitors had stand­
ing to bring suit in deceptive-advertising cases.54  It was not until 
1971, however, that the courts addressed the question of consumer 
standing.55  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided in Colli­
gan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd. that consumers lacked 
standing to bring actions under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.56 
Nearly forty years later, in 1993, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
rendered the same holding in Serbin v. Ziebart International 
Corp.57  The vast majority of courts have fallen in line with the Col­
ligan and Serbin decisions and denied a private right of action to 
consumers.58  Further, both the Second and Third Circuit Courts 
have expressed that a private right of action for consumers under 
section 43(a) was not necessary due to other viable avenues, such as 
ties Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The intent of this chapter is . . . to protect persons 
engaged in [ ] commerce against unfair competition.”). 
54. L’Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).  The 
L’Aiglon court went on to state that “[section 43(a)] is a provision of a federal statute 
which, with clarity and precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and de­
fines rights and duties [for corporate competitors] and provides for their vindication in 
the federal courts.” Id. at 651. 
55. De Sevo, supra note 48, at 8. R 
56. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693. 
57. Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993). 
58. Berni v. Int’l Gourmet Rests. of Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(“Although a section 43 plaintiff need not be a direct competitor, it is apparent that, at 
a minimum, standing to bring a section 43 claim requires the potential for a commercial 
or competitive injury.” (citations omitted)); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The Lanham Act . . . constitute[s] a private 
remedial scheme for the benefit of disgruntled competitors whereas the FTC Act more 
specifically serves the public interest and is enforced by the FTC.”); Albert Furst von 
Thurn und Taxis v. Karl Prince von Thurn und Taxis, No. 04 Civ. 6107 (DAB), 2006 WL 
2289847, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006) (“Standing to assert a § 43(a) claim is limited to 
a ‘purely commercial class’ of plaintiffs.” (quoting Colligan, 442 F.2d at 692)); Joint 
Stock Soc’y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 692, 708 (D. Del. 1999) (“[I]n order to 
maintain standing under Section 43, a litigant must, at a minimum, establish the ‘poten­
tial for a commercial or competitive injury.’” (quoting Berni, 838 F.2d at 648)); Katz­
man v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[O]nly 
commercial entities with a reasonable interest to be protected may sue under [section 
43(a)].”); Loy v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 991, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(“[I]f Congress had contemplated the major change urged . . . and bestowed standing 
under Section 43(a) on pure consumers, it would have done so explicitly.”); Shonac 
Corp. v. AMKO Int’l, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 919, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“[T]he purpose of 
§ 43(a) is revealed to be ‘to protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair 
competition.’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)). 
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state consumer protection laws or Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) intervention.59 
The courts have time and again followed the L’Aiglon Apparel 
decision and stated that only corporate competitors may bring suit 
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.60  In support of these deci­
sions, scholars have acknowledged that, had Congress intended to 
provide consumers any relief under section 43(a), there would have 
been some semblance of this intent in the statute’s text or legisla­
tive history.61  The Colligan and Serbin courts speculated that what 
Congress did intend to create was a remedy that protected commer­
cial interests from unfair commercial conduct.62  These inferences 
were drawn from consideration of whether the plaintiff had a “rea­
sonable interest to be protected against false advertising.”63 
Accordingly, corporate competitors have been granted both 
economic and equitable remedies under section 43(a) of the Lan­
ham Act.64  The Lanham Act provides for both injunctive relief as 
well as damages.65  As far as injunctions are concerned, section 
43(a) claims do not require a plaintiff to show the full extent of 
actual damages; rather, plaintiffs need only demonstrate a “likeli­
hood of deception” and “the fact of damage.”66  Perhaps the most 
attractive feature of the Lanham Act’s remedies is the sheer broad­
ness of its damages provisions, which empower courts to award 
59. Thill, supra note 53, at 376-77. R 
60. Robert S. Saunders, Note, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic Justification 
for Competitors’ Actions for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
77 VA. L. REV. 563, 572 (1991); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. R 
61. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 693-94; De Sevo, supra note 48, at 26. R 
62. Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175; Colligan, 442 F.2d at 694; Ketterman, supra note 3, at R 
38. 
63. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1981). 
64. Reed, supra note 10, at 259.  It has been a long-standing rule among the R 
courts that any consumer rights that may be embodied within section 43(a) “must be 
invoked by a competitor of the defendant, not by a buyer from the defendant.”  5 J. 
THOMAS  MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON  TRADEMARKS AND  UNFAIR  COMPETITION 
§ 27:25 (4th ed. 1996).  In sum, it seems as if courts will continue to adhere to the belief 
that corporate competitors are “the ultimate beneficiar[ies]” of the Act, and consumers 
in turn will be protected by “competitor-instigated suits.”  Burns, supra note 48, at 837. R 
65. Successful plaintiffs in section 43(a) Lanham suits may receive damages rep­
resenting compensation for disgorgement of profits, dilution of the mark, harm to repu­
tation and goodwill, cost of corrective advertising, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. 
Bundy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 748 F.2d 767, 771-74 (2d Cir. 1984).  The typical dam­
age award under section 43(a), however, may be limited to “the infringer’s profits, any 
damages to the trademark owner, the costs of the action, and, in exceptional cases, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.” ADAM L. BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK  LAW: PROTECTION, 
ENFORCEMENT AND LICENSING § 9.05[B], at 9-102 (1999). 
66. 1A ALTMAN & CALLMANN, supra note 30, § 5.5, at 5-38-39. R 
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treble damages in cases of particularly egregious conduct.67  Since 
1982, there have been approximately two hundred section 43(a) 
cases tried in federal courts where monetary damages were 
awarded.68  Not surprisingly, eighty-six percent of the damages in 
those cases have been awarded since the rapid emergence of the 
Internet Age in the early 1990s.69  Fifty percent of all trademark 
damages since 1982 included an award of enhanced damages, and 
seventy-seven percent of those damages were trebled.70 
Because the courts perceived the Lanham Act as offering pro­
tection solely to corporate plaintiffs, the federal government ac­
knowledged that consumers were left without remedy for similar 
causes of action.71  This led to the modification of the FTCA, which, 
in turn, spurred the evolution of the DTPAs within the states.  Like 
the Lanham Act, these state acts included their own standing re­
quirements.72  Ironically, these standing requirements are antitheti­
cal to those of the Lanham Act; oftentimes, standing is limited 
solely to consumers unless a corporate plaintiff can make some sort 
of special evidentiary showing.73  It is these requirements that cre­
ate problems for corporate plaintiffs when attempting to bring suit 
under the DTPAs. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006).  By definition, treble damages are “[d]amages that, 
by statute, are three times the amount of actual damages that the fact-finder determines 
is owed.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (9th ed. 2009).  Treble damages are typically 
awarded where the state regards the conduct involved to be “particularly reprehensi­
ble.”  Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972).  Damages of this kind are almost al­
ways considered strictly penal in nature.  Dunbar v. Jones, 87 A. 787, 788 (Conn. 1913). 
68. GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: VALUA­
TION, EXPLOITATION, AND INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES § 42.4, at 726 (2005). 
69. Id.  This high percentage of damages likely represents the ease with which 
one can infringe upon another’s trademark via the Internet. See Baker & McKenzie 
Seminar Series on International Litigation and Arbitration, 11 WORLD ARB. & MEDIA­
TION REP. 229, 230 (2000), available at 11 WAMREP 229 (Westlaw) (“Due to the In­
ternet’s ease of use and low cost in transmitting files globally, intellectual property rules 
are being tested when they attempt to adequately protect those who hold . . . trade­
marks.”).  The number of section 43(a) cases tried in federal courts with monetary dam­
ages awarded has likely risen since Smith and Parr’s book was published in 2005. 
70. Id. at 729-30. 
71. See Burns, supra note 48, at 837-38. R 
72. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. R 
73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. R 
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II. PAVING THE ROAD TO CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE
 
TRANSITION FROM THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
 
ACT TO STATE DECEPTIVE TRADE
 
PRACTICES ACTS
 
Despite the passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,74 
companies within the United States continued to grow to epic pro­
portions and monopolized industries to such an extent that the leg­
islation attempting to cap their power was moot.75  The FTC was 
created in 1914 with the passing of the FTCA to curtail such an­
ticompetitive practices.76  In its original form, the FTCA was meant 
only to ban practices that were detrimental to a competitor’s busi­
ness.77  Years later, Congress amended section 5 of the FTCA to 
prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com­
merce”;78 accordingly, the FTC was granted the power to protect 
consumers.79 
The standard to bring suit under the FTCA is significantly less 
stringent than that of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.80  Currently, 
under the FTCA, it is illegal “to ‘disseminate, or cause to be dis­
seminated, any false advertisement . . . [which] induc[es], or . . . is 
likely to induce . . . the purchase of food, drugs, devices, services, or 
cosmetics.’”81  In litigating these claims, the FTC developed the 
“reasonable consumer” test82 to control in situations where mate­
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006). 
75. Andy J. Miller, Note, A Procedural Approach to “Unfair Methods of Compe­
tition,” 93 IOWA L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2008) (quoting DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERI­
CANS: THE  DEMOCRATIC  EXPERIENCE 418 (1973)).  One of the companies in the 
forefront of the Sherman Act’s “failure” was Standard Oil, which continued to expand 
and grow larger despite the presence of the Sherman Act. Id.  Attempting to pass legis­
lation against such monolithic companies has been compared to “passing a law against 
the wind.” Id.  Still, even after Standard Oil had been dissolved, the Sherman Act was 
not reformed. Id. 
76. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58). 
77. See Sheila B. Scheuerman, The Consumer Fraud Class Action: Reining in 
Abuse by Requiring Plaintiffs to Allege Reliance as an Essential Element, 43 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 1, 11 (2006). 
78. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also Jon Mize, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resis­
tance: Re-Examining the Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 
72 TENN. L. REV. 653, 656 (2005). 
79. For a general discussion of the FTCA’s legislative history, see Holloway v. 
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 990-96 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Scheuerman, supra 
note 77, at 12. R 
80. See Mize, supra note 78, at 654-58. R 
81. Id. at 656-57 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 52). 
82. Under the “reasonable consumer” test, the FTC must not only show that “de­
ception was probable” but also that deception would occur to “consumers acting rea­
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rial business deceptions are likely to cause injury to a consumer 
who “reasonably rel[ies]” on the offending deceptive material.83 
Although the FTCA’s provisions are clear, the Act has one 
flaw—it lacks a definition for the term “deceptive trade practice.”84 
It merely provides several catch-all provisions under which a decep­
tive trade practice might occur.85  The FTC is tasked with the en­
forcement of these policies and pursues only claims that “would be 
to the interest of the public.”86  However, claims brought under the 
FTCA do not equip potential plaintiffs—the members of the pub­
lic—with a private right of action.87 
The FTC was widely criticized throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
because it lacked the ability to fully and adequately address the 
problems of consumer fraud that the nation faced, particularly due 
to its failure to provide a private right of action for plaintiffs.88  In 
response, beginning in the early 1960s, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws89 (“NCCUSL”) brought 
forth the UDTPA.90  The UDTPA was created in order to delineate 
specific deceptive practices that may create a “likelihood of public 
deception.”91  The uniform act also expressly provided that corpo­
sonably in the circumstances.”  Lemley, supra note 26, at 318.  The test only applies to R 
material deceptions that have been reasonably relied upon and are likely to cause injury 
to a consumer. Id. 
83. Id.; see Karns, supra note 19, at 388. R 
84. The FTCA states only that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are . . . 
declared unlawful.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); see also Lemley, supra note 26, at 319. R 
85. Lemley, supra note 26, at 320. R 
86. 15 U.S.C. §45(b); see Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade 
Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO  ST. L.J. 437, 442 
(1991). 
87. Miller, supra note 75, at 1495. R 
88. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND 
THE LAW § 8:2 (2008); see also Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in 
Consumer Protection: At Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 
131, 141 (2006). 
89. The NCCUSL was created in 1892 with the united goal of bringing uniformity 
to the laws of the states. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS­
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
MEETING IN  ITS  SEVENTY-THIRD  YEAR 308 (1964).  The NCCUSL attempts to bring 
about uniformity in the law “by creating potential laws that it then tries to get the states 
to adopt.”  Travis McDade, Legal Research, A.B.A. STUDENT LAW., Feb. 2009, at 12, 12. 
90. See generally UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (amended 1966, with­
drawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
91. The UDTPA’s prohibition of deceptive trade practices reads as follows: 
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of
 
his business, vocation, or occupation, he:
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rate entities were entitled to protection under its auspices.92  The 
UDTPA was revised in 1966 and provided that the prevailing party 
in suit be awarded costs and may receive attorneys’ fees.93 
Four years later, the FTC joined forces with the Committee on 
Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments to 
draft the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 
(“UTP/CPL”).94  The UTP/CPL provided a private right of action 
for consumers, allowing for not only damages with a statutory mini­
mum but also for the institution of class actions.95  Not to be out­
done, the NCCUSL, with the aid of the American Bar Association, 
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another; 
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source,
 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;
 
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation,
 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another;
 
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in
 
connection with goods or services;
 
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, charac­
teristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or that
 
a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he
 
does not have;
 
(6) represents that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, al­
tered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or second-hand;
 
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality,
 
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of
 
another;
 
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or mis­
leading representation of fact;
 
(9) advertises goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised; 
(10) advertises goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably ex­
pectable public demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of
 
quantity;
 
(11) makes false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons
 
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; or
 
(12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of 
confusion or of misunderstanding. 
Id. § 2; see also Dole, supra note 11, at 486 (explaining that the UDTPA strictly forbade R 
the substitution of goods, trademark infringement, false designations of origin, false 
advertising, disparagement, bait-and-switch advertising, pricing fraud, as well as con­
duct tending to create confusion, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings). 
92. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT § 1 (noting in the “Definitions” 
section that “[a] ‘person’ means an individual, corporation, government, or governmen­
tal subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated asso­
ciation, two or more of any of the foregoing having a joint or common interest, or any 
other legal or commercial entity” (emphases added)). 
93. Id. § 3(b). 
94. PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 88, § 3:5. R 
95. See Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law §§ 8(a)-8(b) (sug­
gested legislation), in THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE 
LEGISLATION 144, 148-49 (1969). 
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suggested another model act—the Uniform Consumer Sales Prac­
tice Act (“UCSPA”), which applied solely to transactions between 
consumers.96  By the early 1970s, the majority of the states had 
adopted one form or another of the three proposed uniform mod­
els—which came to be known as DTPAs.97 
96. JONATHAN  SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND  DECEPTIVE 
ACTS AND PRACTICES § 3.4.2.3 (5th ed. 2001). 
97. The UDTPA has been adopted in twelve states, while the UCSPA has been 
adopted in four.  Rachel S. Kowal, Warranty and the Courts, in PRODUCT WARRANTY 
HANDBOOK 97, 116 (Wallace R. Blischke & D. N. Prabhakar Murthy eds., 1996); see 
also LII: Uniform Business and Financial Laws Locator, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uniform/vol7.html (last visited May 13, 2010) (providing a table of uniform laws and the 
states that have enacted them, including the UDTPA and the UCSPA).  The remaining 
states have adopted either some form of the UTP/CPL or statutes that prohibit specific 
unfair practices.  D. Wes Sullenger, Only We Can Save You: When and Why Non-Con­
sumer Businesses Have Standing to Sue Business Competitors Under the Tennessee Con­
sumer Protection Act, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 485, 492 (2005); see, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8­
19-1 to -15 (LexisNexis 2002); ALASKA  STAT. §§ 45.50.471-.561 (2008); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521 to -1534 (2003); ARK. CODE  ANN. §§ 4-88-101 to -115 (2001); 
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 2009); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-09, 
17500-09 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-1-101 to -115 (West 2001); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-110a to -110q (West 2007); DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2511­
2527, 2531-2536 (2005); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3901 to -3911 (LexisNexis 2001); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 501.201-.213 (West 2006); GA. CODE  ANN. §§ 10-1-370 to -427 (2009); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480-21 to -24, 481A-1 to -5, 481B-1 to -25 (LexisNexis 2009); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-601 to -619 (2003); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1 to /12, 
510/1 to /7 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-0.5-1 to -12 (West 2005); IOWA CODE 
ANN. §§ 714.16-.16A (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 to -640 (2005); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 367.110-.360 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401-1420 
(2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A to 214 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, §§ 1211-1216 (2009); MD. CODE  ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101 to -501 (LexisNexis 
2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-11 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.901­
.922 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325D.09-.16, 325D.43-.48 (West 2004); MISS. 
CODE  ANN. §§ 75-24-1 to -27 (West 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.010-.307 (West 
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to -143 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-1601 to 
-1623 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-301 to -306 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 598.0903-.0999 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.600 (LexisNexis 
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:1 to -A:13 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to 
-91 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -24 (West 2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 63(12) (McKinney 2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 349-350 (McKinney 2004); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1 to -42 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-15-01 to -11 (2007); OHIO 
REV. CODE  ANN. §§ 1345.01-.13, 4165.01-.04 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 
§§ 751-763 (West 1993 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 78, §§ 51-55 (West 2001); 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.605-.656 (2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 201-1 to -9.3 (West 
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-13.1-1 to -28 (2001 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5­
10 to -160 (1985 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-24-1 to -40 (2004); TENN. 
CODE  ANN. §§ 47-18-101 to -125 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE  ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 
(Vernon 2001); UTAH  CODE  ANN. §§ 13-5-1 to -18, 13-11-1 to -23 (2005); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451-2480n (2006); VA. CODE  ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (2006); WASH. 
REV. CODE  ANN. §§ 19.86.010-.920 (West 1998 & Supp. 2010); W. VA. CODE  ANN. 
§§ 46A-6-101 to -110 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18, 100.20-.264 (West 
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Unsurprisingly, because each state adopted a different form of 
the DTPA, each with different standing requirements, litigation 
across the states under these acts is tumultuous at best.  Unfortu­
nately, in early 2000, the NCCUSL withdrew the best option for 
uniformity, the UDTPA.98  The NCCUSL believed that the 
UDTPA had been rendered obsolete by virtue of the Lanham Act’s 
1988 amendments.99  However, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is 
designed to have a symbiotic relationship with state law causes of 
action, supplementing the DTPAs as opposed to preempting 
them.100  In light of this fact, the NCCUSL’s argument for obsoles­
cence seems to be moot.  But the NCCUSL’s obsolescence argu­
ment does give rise to the assertion that this relationship ought to 
be evaluated such that DTPA claims are afforded the same level of 
scrutiny in favor of corporate competitors as Lanham Act claims. 
III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN SECTION 43(A) LANHAM ACT
 
CLAIMS AND STATE DECEPTIVE TRADE
 
PRACTICE ACT CLAIMS
 
Because the DTPAs were crafted from the FTCA, they share a 
special relationship with section 43(a) of the Lanham Act—they are 
supposed to work together as opposed to separately.101  The origi­
nal purpose of both the Lanham Act and the DTPAs was the pro­
tection of business against undue competition and interference.102 
It is often the case in false-advertising claims between corporate 
2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-101 to -114 (2009); see also Scheuerman, supra note 
77, at 18-19. R 
98. Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State “Laborato­
ries” and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKE­
LEY  TECH. L.J. 1363, 1392 (2005).  The NCCUSL, which houses its archives at the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Biddle Law Library, no longer maintains viable records 
regarding the UDTPA. See Penn Law—Biddle Law Library Archives: NCCUSL 
Drafts and Final Acts, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm (last visited 
May 10, 2010) (detailing more than four dozen model acts but specifically excluding the 
UDTPA). 
99. See generally Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 
Stat. 3935. 
100. Lemley, supra note 26, at 312-13. R 
101. Id. at 327. 
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The intent of this chapter is . . . to protect 
persons engaged in [ ] commerce against unfair competition.”); UNIF. DECEPTIVE 
TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 
265 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/ 
rudtpa66.pdf (stating that the UDTPA was created in the hopes of stopping 
“[d]eceptive conduct constituting unreasonable interference with another’s promotion 
and conduct of business”). 
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competitors that one corporate entity has infringed upon the 
other’s trademark.103  In these cases, there may only be a federal 
remedy, in part because competitors are granted standing under the 
Lanham Act but not under all of the DTPAs.  There can be no state 
remedy where the corporate competitor lacks standing in the state 
forum, and the absence of a state remedy can lead to irreparable 
harm to the corporation’s reputation in the local marketplace.104 
With the onset of the “heyday of consumerism,” state legisla­
tors were eager to provide their constituents with a means of pro­
tecting themselves against unfair and deceptive trade practices.105 
Several policy considerations underlay the adoption of the DTPAs. 
First and foremost, there existed and still remains a great difference 
in bargaining power in the marketplace between consumers and 
merchants.106  With the advancing corporate markets of the 1970s 
and 1980s, the doctrine of caveat emptor could no longer be applied 
because transactions were no longer made at arm’s length.107  This 
concept continues to prevail, especially in today’s age of 
technology. 
An equally important consideration in the adoption of the 
DTPAs was deterrence of future harm against the consuming pub­
103. See Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1992) 
(“Trademark infringers inflict injury not only on their competitors, . . . but they also 
inflict pervasive injuries on consumers.”). 
104. Attorney Garrett J. Waltzer gave voice to these concerns in a Comment writ­
ten for the UCLA Law Review, stating, 
Because consumers are mostly incapable of distinguishing between the in­
fringed product and the infringing product, any customer dissatisfaction result­
ing from inferior products bearing a false trademark detrimentally affects the 
reputation of the target of the infringement.  Thus, [competitors who are] vic­
tims of trademark infringement [through false advertising] suffer additional 
injury to their reputations. 
Garrett J. Waltzer, Comment, Monetary Relief for False Advertising Claims Arising 
Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 34 UCLA L. REV. 953, 971 (1987) (footnote 
omitted). 
105. J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: 
Judicial Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 347 (1992); 
see also Michael Flynn & Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance: 
The Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 57 CON­
SUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 60, 60-61 (2003). 
106. Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal to Ex­
tend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1625-26 (1983). 
107. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 
1133 (1931) (discussing the origins and past development of the doctrine of caveat 
emptor); see also Olha N.M. Rybakoff, An Overview of Consumer Protection and Fair 
Trade Regulation in Delaware, 8 DEL. L. REV. 63, 64-66 (2005) (discussing the modern 
evolution of the doctrine of caveat emptor). 
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lic.108  With a private right of action available, merchants seeking to 
defraud their customers would be on guard for fear that their less-
than-pristine actions might result in a lawsuit.109  In effect, consum­
ers would gain not only the power of self-vindication but also the 
charge of becoming watchdogs in the marketplace.110 
The DTPAs are composed of language lifted directly from ei­
ther the FTCA or the provisions of the UDTPA, UTP/CPL, and the 
UCSPA,111 thus earning the nickname “Little FTC Acts.”112  Un­
like their federal counterpart, the DTPAs offer damages to their 
consumer-plaintiffs in various forms, including, but not limited to, 
treble damages,113 other punitive damages, statutory minimum 
damages, and attorneys’ fees.114  Although due consideration has 
been given to the potential bonuses that may be afforded to plain­
tiffs bringing suit under the DTPAs, an evaluation of the DTPAs 
would not be complete without acknowledging what these statutes 
are missing. 
A. What Is a “Deceptive Trade Practice”? 
The DTPAs and the FTCA share a common feature: they both 
lack a concrete definition of “deceptive trade practices.”115  How­
ever, this ambiguity may well have been deliberate—it has been 
suggested that legislators feared that the inclusion of more specific 
language might fail to protect consumers against future, unforesee­
able deceptive practices;116 foreclose future avenues of litigation; 
108. Note, supra note 106, at 1626. R 
109. The House of Representatives noted that “[i]f deterrence is to be effective, 
the enforcement initiative must come from the private sector.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-1008, 
pt. 1, at 5 (1980). 
110. Note, supra note 106, at 1626. R 
111. Karns, supra note 19, at 375-76. R 
112. The term “Little FTC Acts” refers to consumer-protection statutes whose 
provisions are based upon the FTCA.  Note, supra note 106, at 1622 n.5. R 
113. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. R 
114. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West 2007) (allowing for 
award of punitive damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (instituting treble 
damages); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004) (instituting statutory minimum 
damages); see also Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or 
Deceptive Practices, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 125, 130 (1987) (“All of those states that have 
private rights of action now have provisions for attorneys’ fees.”). 
115. See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 
657, 658 (1985) (acknowledging that a consensus has yet to have been reached as to the 
definition of a “deceptive trade practice”); see also Lemley, supra note 26, at 319-20. R 
116. Lee Ann Bundren, State Consumer Fraud Legislation Applied to the Health 
Care Industry, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 138 (1995). 
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and defeat the statute’s original purpose117: to prohibit conduct that 
would likely cause confusion in the marketplace.118 
Akin to section 43(a) Lanham Act actions, DTPAs also have 
mandatory standing requirements.  The vast majority of states with 
DTPAs define potential plaintiffs as either “a person” or “a con­
sumer.”119  Section 43(a)’s standing requirements and the DTPAs’ 
standing requirements are on the opposite sides of the same coin. 
While section 43(a)’s “any person”120 provision has been restricted 
to allow only corporate competitors to bring suit,121 the DTPAs’ 
“any person”122 provision has been taken to exclude or restrict 
availability of remedy to corporate competitors in most cases.123  To 
determine if a corporate competitor may bring suit under a DTPA, 
one must look not only to the statutory definitions involved but also 
to the particular injury alleged.124  To perform this inquiry, Parts 
117. HEALTH  LAW  DIV., AM. BAR  ASS’N, E-HEALTH  BUSINESS AND  TRANSAC­
TIONAL LAW 106 (Barbara Bennett ed., 2002).  At the time the DTPAs were first writ­
ten, the drafters could not foresee the advent of the technology age and the inception of 
the Internet. Id.  These innovations are unique to our time, and no one could have 
anticipated their creation, much less the unparalleled illegalities they would have the 
potential to harbor. 
118. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(12) (amended 1966, with­
drawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 280 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf; see also Dole, supra note 11, at 486.  Many courts in R 
the northeastern United States have all but ruled out the validity of the prime cause of 
such effects—trademark infringement. See Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 
Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (“‘[T]rademark 
cases are outside the scope of [New York’s] consumer protection statute.’” (quoting 
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413 n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002))).  This premise will be discussed further in Part IV of this Note. See 
infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text. R 
119. For example, the DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York each 
describe injured parties as “any person.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2008); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h); see Flynn & Slater, supra note 
105, at 63. R 
120. See De Sevo, supra note 48, at 2-3, 8.  These questions of ability to bring suit R 
boil down to the federal courts’ adherence to prudential standing limitations, which are 
“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.”  Apgar, supra 
note 48, at 2394 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). R 
121. Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993); Colligan v. 
Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 693 (2d Cir. 1971). 
122. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 63. R 
123. Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Do Businesses Have Standing to Sue Under State 
Consumer Fraud Statutes?, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 385, 386-87 (1996). 
124. Id. at 386.  Although this Note focuses upon the states within the First, Sec­
ond, and Third Federal Circuits (Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, and Ver­
mont), in the interest of brevity, only one state from each circuit will be discussed at 
length. 
569 
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III.A.1-3 of this Note will explore the DTPAs of one state from 
each of the First, Second, and Third Circuits—specifically, Massa­
chusetts, New York, and New Jersey. 
1. Massachusetts 
The Massachusetts DTPA, chapter 93A of the Massachusetts 
General Laws,125 was amended in 1972 to address “unfair or decep­
tive act[s] or practice[s]” between corporate competitors.126  To 
mount a successful suit against a competitor, a corporate plaintiff 
must prove that the corporate defendant acted with “rascality.”127 
The rascality test is a difficult threshold to meet and oftentimes re­
quires the corporate defendant to act as “a ‘jackal,’ guilty of ‘mani­
fest . . . rascality.’”128  In addition to the strict rascality requirement, 
to bring suit under the Massachusetts DTPA, corporate competitors 
must prove that the alleged unfair or deceptive act is not a common 
business practice.129  In light of these requirements, corporate 
plaintiffs under the Massachusetts act must claim that the defen­
dant’s behavior had a “rancid flavor of unfairness” to invoke 93A 
protection.130 
Massachusetts’s DTPA limits a corporate plaintiff’s ability to 
bring a trademark suit against a competitor.  In McKernan v. Burek, 
the plaintiff and the defendant were corporate competitors in the 
business of manufacturing novelty stickers.131  The plaintiff claimed 
that the defendant copied his sticker and then attempted to sell it as 
if it were the defendant’s own.132  The district court found that the 
plaintiff’s trademark infringement claims ultimately failed because 
the trademark in question was not inherently distinctive.133  Fur­
thermore, the court noted that had those claims been actionable 
under law, it is likely that judgment would still have been rendered 
for the defendant because the plaintiff would have been required to 
125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (2008). 
126. Id. § 11. 
127. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1979) (“The 
objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of 
someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.”).  Rascality is 
defined as of or relating to a rascal, that is, “a mean, unprincipled, or dishonest person.” 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1031 (11th ed. 2005). 
128. Atl. Cement Co. v. S. Shore Bank, 730 F.2d 831, 834 (1st Cir. 1984) (omis­
sion in original). 
129. Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 80, 88 (Mass. 1983). 
130. Atkinson v. Rosenthal, 598 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). 
131. McKernan v. Burek, 118 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D. Mass. 2000). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 124. 
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prove the appropriate level of “rascality” as well as an actual 
loss.134 
2. New York 
In contrast, to have standing under the New York DTPA, a 
corporation need only demonstrate that its competitor’s action has 
had some effect on the public at large.135  The New York DTPA, 
New York General Business Law section 349, declares unlawful 
“deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or 
commerce . . . in the furnishing of any service in [the] state”136 and 
allows “any person who has been injured by reason of [such] viola­
tion” to bring suit.137  An act is deceptive within the meaning of the 
New York DTPA only if it is “likely to mislead a reasonable con­
sumer.”138  In providing that actions may be brought by “any per­
son”139 so injured, it appears that the legislators responsible for 
drafting the Act did not contemplate a proviso that limits potential 
plaintiffs solely to “consumers.”140  To bring forth a successful 
claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s consumer-
oriented acts were misleading in a material way such that the plain­
tiff was injured as a result.141  In applying the New York DTPA to 
suits between corporate competitors, the courts have read in a 
“public interest requirement.”142  Specifically, “some harm to the 
public at large [must be] at issue.”143  Where the underpinning of 
134. Id. at 125-26. 
135. Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
In examining claims made between corporate competitors, the courts have stated on 
multiple occasions that “the gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or 
harm to the public interest.”  Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 
(PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (quoting Gucci Am., Inc., 277 
F. Supp. 2d at 273) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 2004). 
137. Id. § 349(h). 
138. Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Maurizo v. Gold­
smith, 230 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
139. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h). 
140. Joseph Thomas Moldovan, New York Creates a Private Right of Action to 
Combat Consumer Fraud: Caveat Venditor, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 509, 525-26 (1982). 
“Businessmen . . . are victimized by deceptive and fraudulent business practices and 
suffer from the unethical conduct of their competitors.  Inasmuch as one of the main 
purposes of the Act is to deter the commission of such practices, . . . it is imperative that 
those with the greatest financial means available . . . bring suit.” Id. at 527 n.67. 
141. Maurizio, 230 F.3d at 521; Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 
F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
142. Moldovan, supra note 140, at 529. R 
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. R 
571 
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the complaint demonstrates only harm to another business, courts 
have routinely rejected corporate competitors’ claims made under 
section 349.144 
Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc.145 is the leading case in 
New York regarding corporate competitor claims made under the 
DTPA. Karam Prasad arose out of an action for trademark in­
fringement after it was discovered that the defendant’s retail chain 
had appropriated a crystalline logo from the plaintiff’s high-end 
brand of designer jeans.146  In addition to its federal trademark 
claim, the plaintiff claimed that the infringement constituted a vio­
lation of New York’s DTPA.147  The plaintiff’s DTPA claim never 
made it to trial because the defendant filed a motion to dismiss as 
to that particular cause of action, the motion stating that the plain­
tiff had not “sufficiently alleged a harm to the public interest.”148 
The district court agreed and dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of ac­
tion under the DTPA.149  The court noted that “trademark infringe­
ment actions alleging only general consumer confusion do not 
threaten the direct harm to consumers that is required to state a 
claim under Section 349.”150  Interestingly, however, the Karam 
Prasad case created a split within the Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.151 
Five years earlier, in GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., the 
district court found that the defendant had engaged in a deceptive 
act through its intentional use of the plaintiff’s mark.152  Here, the 
plaintiff was the master licensee for the successful “FUBU” fashion 
brand.153  The plaintiff had launched a lucrative men’s campaign us­
ing the number “05.”154  The defendant began to sell similarly de­
144. See, e.g., Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 96 
Civ. 5150, 1997 WL 137443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997); Winner Int’l v. Kryptonite 
Corp., No. 95 Civ. 247, 1996 WL 84476, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996); Fashion Bou­
tique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4544, 1992 WL 170559, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1992).  The majority of these cases address the issue of trademark 
infringement in concert with false advertising of the plaintiff corporation’s products. 
145. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 
2438396 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007). 
146. Id. at *1. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *2. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. (quoting Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 
96 Civ. 5150, 1997 WL 127443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997)). 
151. Id. 
152. GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
153. Id. at 279. 
154. Id. 
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signed men’s clothing using plaintiff’s “05” mark.155  The district 
court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and concluded that because the 
defendant had caused actual consumer confusion through its appro­
priation of the plaintiff’s mark, it had engaged in a deceptive trade 
practice.156  While this case was litigated only five years earlier, 
GTFM is at complete odds with Karam Prasad. 
3. New Jersey 
Although New Jersey is in New York’s backyard, its laws con­
cerning deceptive trade practices are completely different.  Under 
the New Jersey DTPA, “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable 
loss of moneys or property, real or personal,”157 has standing if that 
person has suffered the loss through “any unconscionable commer­
cial practice,158 deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, mis­
representation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or 
omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such 
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale 
or advertisement of any merchandise [or services].”159  The New 
Jersey DTPA is designed “to protect consumers who purchase 
‘goods or services generally sold to the public at large.’”160  Accord­
ingly, to bring suit under the New Jersey DTPA, a corporate plain­
tiff must prove that it was acting as a consumer purchasing “‘goods 
. . . sold to the public at large’” in the transaction in question.161 
“[T]he mere fact that a corporation purchases the goods for use in 
155. Id. at 284. 
156. Id. at 302. 
157. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (stating that “any person who suffers 
any ascertainable loss . . . may bring an action or assert a counterclaim”); see Cox v. 
Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 463-64 (1994) (noting that plaintiffs are entitled to 
treble damages only if they can prove an ascertainable loss). 
158. In Kugler v. Romain, the New Jersey Supreme Court defined the phrase “un­
conscionable commercial practices” as “an amorphous concept obviously designed to 
establish a broad business ethic . . . [implying a lack of] good faith, honesty in fact and 
observance of fair dealing.”  Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651-52 (N.J. 1971). 
159. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.  For an in-depth discussion of the evolution of the 
New Jersey DTPA, see Lisa J. Trembly & Michael F. Bevacqua, Back to the Future with 
the Consumer Fraud Act: New Jersey Sets the Standard for Consumer Protection, 29 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 193 (2004). 
160. Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone Card Co., 756 A.2d 636, 637-38 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000) (quoting Marascio v. Campanella, 689 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).  The New Jersey DTPA has been construed to afford pro­
tection to both corporate and commercial entities that “purchase goods and services for 
use in their business operations.” Id. at 638. 
161. Id. at 637-38 (quoting Marascio, 689 A.2d at 857). 
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its business does not preclude invocation of the [New Jersey DTPA] 
and its regulations.”162 
While some state laws give varying measures of relief for such 
conduct, general reliance on state protection has led to inconsis­
tency and unpredictability as well as to important gaps in protec­
tion.163  As has been shown, in Massachusetts, New York, and New 
Jersey—neighboring states in the First, Second, and Third Circuits, 
respectively—what is required of a corporate plaintiff to bring suit 
differs tremendously among the three.  Inconsistencies in the law 
would be abundant if a corporate plaintiff were to litigate a DTPA 
claim among these three states.  It is alarming to think about the 
financial hardship that a corporate entity would incur if it had to 
litigate DTPA claims in all eleven states that compose the First, 
Second, and Third Circuits, let alone the rest of the states across the 
country.  To remedy this unique problem and avoid legal chaos, 
something must be done. 
IV. PROTECTING CORPORATE COMPETITORS: THE ARGUMENT
 
FOR TRANSFORMING THE DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACTS
 
TO ACCOMMODATE BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
 
The special relationship between the Lanham Act and the 
FTCA,164 both originally created in order to protect business com­
petitors,165 yielded the inception of the DTPAs.166  Surprisingly, 
most of the DTPAs do not afford the same consideration to corpo­
rate entities as was originally intended by the model acts.167  Often, 
corporate competitors are denied the right to bring suit under the 
DTPAs in the Northeast,168 especially in trademark infringement 
162. Marascio, 689 A.2d at 857.  For the purposes of the New Jersey DTPA, mer­
chandise, or, in other words, goods sold to the public at large, is defined as “any objects, 
wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the 
public for sale.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(c). 
163. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 65. R 
164. Both the Lanham Act and the FTCA address deceptiveness via means of 
false advertising and other unfair trade practices, seeking to prohibit “unfair or decep­
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); see also 
Wrona, supra note 4, at 1091-92. R 
165. See Scheuerman, supra note 77, at 11. R 
166. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. R 
167. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1212 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 201-3 (West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956, §§ 6-13.1-2, 6-13.1-5 (2001); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, § 2453 (2006). 
168. See statutes cited supra note 167. R 
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actions.169  If corporate competitors are allowed to file suit under 
the DTPAs at all, it is often with rigid restrictions.170  In fact, in 
most states in the Northeast, trademark infringement actions aris­
ing out of false advertising between corporate competitors are all 
but precluded from litigation under state law.171 
The DTPAs ought to provide corporate competitors the same 
sort of protection and uniformity that federal legislation such as the 
Lanham Act affords.172  The lack of uniformity present within the 
DTPAs has led not only to a dearth of successful litigation on the 
part of corporate plaintiffs but also to an intracircuit split, predomi­
nantly in cases involving trademarks.173  To remedy these issues, it 
is necessary for state legislative bodies to reconsider the current 
DTPAs in favor of a new system.  Ideally, a new system would en­
able corporate competitors to stand in the much-favored shoes of 
the consumer plaintiff and to succeed on their claims, even across 
state lines.174 
169. See, e.g., Winner Int’l v. Kryptonite Corp., No. 95 Civ. 247, 1996 WL 84476, 
at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1996); EFS Mktg., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 836 F. Supp. 
128, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. 
Supp. 182, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Arbel Corp., No. 86 Civ. 6801, 
1989 WL 125781, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1989). 
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, 
§§ 2, 11 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:2 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19 
(West 2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004). 
171. It is the author’s opinion that the judicial interpretation of this issue paints a 
poor picture of corporations.  The motivation behind each and every corporate entity’s 
suit is not necessarily driven by financial reasons—conversely, consumer opinion plays 
a very strong role in the equation.  Robert C. Bird, Assistant Professor of Marketing 
and Law at the University of Connecticut, School of Business, notes that “[c]onsumer 
perceptions of market information are critically important . . . .  For example, when a 
brand owner sues a rival to stop trademark infringement, harm to the brand owner is 
not the main focus . . . .  [I]t is proof that . . . consumers will be likely to confused [sic] 
between the established and the challenged mark . . . .”  Robert C. Bird, The Impact of 
Legal Standing Rules on Deceptive and Legitimate Advertising Activity 19 (Apr. 1, 
2008) (unpublished working paper, on file with the University of Connecti­
cut–Department of Marketing), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123676. 
172. Glen E. Weston, Trademarks and Unfair Competition by J. Thomas McCar­
thy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 143, 150-51 (1985) (book review) (“The little FTC Acts . . . 
may be sleeping giants with the potential to become major remedies against almost any 
type of unfair competition involving consumer transactions.”). 
173. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 65; Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. R 
07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (“[T]here is a 
split in this Circuit regarding infringement claims under [New York’s DTPA].”). 
174. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 67 (“Effective consumer protection in the R 
Twenty-First Century will mean that consumers and businesses increasingly will need to 
be treated alike.”). 
575 
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Part IV of this Note will examine the origins and various judi­
cial interpretations of the DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
and New York, in terms of their rocky relationships with—and oft-
adverse attitudes towards—corporate competitors.  In particular, 
special attention will be paid to the judicial conflict involving New 
York’s DTPA due to the intracircuit split that has arisen as a result 
of differing interpretations of the statute.  Because of the discord 
among the courts on the issue of whether corporate competitors 
may bring trademark infringement actions under the DTPAs, it has 
become obvious that some sort of solution to this problem must be 
reached.  Part IV will introduce a workable revision of the UDTPA 
that, if adopted, would bring much-needed equality to the north­
eastern United States with regard to the status of corporate com­
petitors’ ability to bring trademark actions under DTPAs. 
A.	 Looking to the Past to Gain Understanding for the Future: 
Interpretation of the DTPAs 
To understand the DTPAs and their resistance to offering cor­
porate competitors the same protections as they would the ordinary 
consumer, one must consider their statutory language, their legisla­
tive history, and the case law that further interprets them.  The Su­
preme Court has stated that “the starting point for interpreting a 
statute is the language of the statute itself.  Absent a clearly ex­
pressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must or­
dinarily be regarded as conclusive.”175  Accordingly, an analysis of 
the DTPAs’ applicability to corporate competitors must begin with 
the language of the statutes themselves. 
1.	 The Plain Language of Each Statute Does Not Exclude 
Corporate Competitors 
The DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York each 
provide in their plain language that “any person” that has been 
damaged by a deceptive trade practice may bring suit for their inju­
ries.176  For the purposes of the Massachusetts DTPA, the term 
175. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). 
176. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11 (2008) (stating that “[a]ny person who en­
gages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers any loss . . . as a result 
of . . . an unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . may . . . bring an action . . . for 
damages”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001) (stating that “[a]ny person who suf­
fers any ascertainable loss . . . as a result of the use . . . of any . . . practice declared 
unlawful under this act . . . may bring an action . . . in any court of competent jurisdic­
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“person” includes “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partner­
ships, incorporated or unincorporated associations, and any other 
legal entity.”177  The New Jersey DTPA’s definition of “person” is 
similar and includes “any natural person or his legal representative, 
partnership, corporation, company, trust, business entity or associa­
tion.”178  Thus, the plain language of both the Massachusetts and 
New Jersey DTPAs requires only that the plaintiff be a person who 
has suffered an injury due to the deceptive trade practice of the 
defendant.179  Nothing in the language of the statutes requires the 
plaintiff to be a consumer or that a consumer be injured by a decep­
tive trade practice to bring suit. 
Although New York’s DTPA does not provide a definition for 
the term “person,” guidance is provided by New York’s Rules of 
Construction, which state that “statutory language is generally con­
strued according to its natural and most obvious sense, without 
resorting to an artificial or forced construction.”180  In terms of New 
York’s DTPA, courts have observed that the definition of the word 
“person,” in its most obvious sense, deals with more than just natu­
ral persons,181 since the DTPA deals with “the conduct of any busi­
ness, trade or commerce.”182  Accordingly, the term “person” under 
New York’s statute may be considered to mean natural persons or 
business entities entitled to the same rights as natural persons.183 
Thus, like the DTPAs of Massachusetts and New Jersey, New 
York’s statute requires nothing more from a plaintiff than a show­
ing that the injury claimed has been caused by a deceptive trade 
practice. 
tion”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 2004) (stating that “any person who 
has been injured by reason of any violation of this section may bring an action . . . to 
enjoin such unlawful act or practice [or] an action to recover his actual damages”). 
177. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1 (emphasis added). 
178. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(d) (emphasis added). 
179. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 11; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19. 
180. N.Y. STAT. § 94 (1971). 
181. “[A]s a threshold matter, plaintiffs [may] claim[ ] the benefit of section 
349—whether individuals or entities . . . .”  Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund 
v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741, 744 (N.Y. 1995) (emphasis added). 
182. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(a). 
183. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “person” as a “human being . . . .  [or] natu­
ral person” and “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having 
most of the rights and duties of a human being.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th 
ed. 2009). 
577 
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2.	 The Legislative Histories of the Statutes Supports the 
Inclusion of Corporate Competitors Within the 
Scope of Their Protection 
Although the statutory language of the DTPAs appears to be 
plain in terms of the right of corporate competitors to bring suit, the 
statutes have been subject to a host of interpretations regarding 
whether corporate competitors ought to be afforded the right to 
bring trademark infringement actions.  To reconcile these issues, it 
then becomes necessary to look to the intent of the state legisla­
tures in order to determine the correct interpretation.184  Legisla­
tive intent can be culled from the legislature’s history leading up to 
the enactment of the statute at issue.185  If legislative intent war­
ranting the ability of corporate competitors to bring suit under the 
DTPAs is found, case law interpreting that intent may dictate 
whether those competitors may bring trademark actions. 
To discuss the legislative intent of the DTPAs of Massachu­
setts, New Jersey, or New York, one must look to the legislative 
history of the FTCA.  All three statutes are based, in part, upon this 
federal act, and all three claim in construing their statements on 
deceptive trade practices that it was the intent of their individual 
state legislatures to follow the guidance provided by, and interpre­
tations of, section 5(a)(1) of the FTCA.186 
The original legislative mandate of the FTCA was to “inhibit 
restraints against trade and protect business from the unfair trade 
practices of their competitors.”187  In 1938, however, Congress 
passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the 1914 version of the 
184. “Consideration of the ‘specific history of the legislative process that 
culminated in the [statute at issue] affords . . . solid ground for giving it appropriate 
meaning’ and for resolving ambiguity present” in interpretation. YULE  KIM, CONG. 
RESEARCH  SERV., STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION: GENERAL  PRINCIPLES AND  RECENT 
TRENDS 42 (2008) (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 
222 (1952)), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. 
185. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 10 (2003). 
186. Section 45(a)(1) of the FTCA states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in 
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com­
merce, are hereby declared unlawful.” Id. § 45(a)(1).  For example, the rules and regu­
lations section of the Massachusetts DTPA states, in relevant part, that “[i]t is the intent 
of the legislature that in construing . . . [the Act], the courts will be guided by the 
interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to sec­
tion 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 
(2008). 
187. JEF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A LE­
GAL CONCEPT 9 (1990). 
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FTCA,188 which allowed the FTC to extend its reach to the protec­
tion of not only businesses but consumers as well.189  The purpose 
of the FTCA, then, is to “preserve, for the benefit of the public, 
active competition” in the marketplace.190  In order to maintain the 
sort of “active competition” in the marketplace that is desired by 
the FTCA, trademarks and other varieties of intellectual property 
must be protected.191 
The fact that the DTPAs of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
New York all purport to stand in the shadow of the FTCA in terms 
of interpretation of deceptive acts bodes well for corporate compet­
itors seeking to bring suit under the DTPAs,192 largely because the 
DTPAs are applied to “matters affecting the consumer public at 
large.”193  The maintenance of active competition in the market­
place certainly affects the consumer public at large.194  And, with­
out corporate competitors, there would be no marketplace at all. 
To achieve this goal, the DTPAs must be read broadly to remain 
consistent with their drafters’ wishes.195  Such a reading will afford 
protection to corporate competitors. 
188. Wheeler-Lea Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111-14 (1938) (amending 15 
U.S.C. § 45 (1934)). 
189. “[T]he Commission could thenceforth prevent unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in commerce which injuriously affected the public interest alone . . . .”  Scien­
tific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1941). 
190. FTC v. Paramount Famous-Lasky Corp., 57 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1932). 
191. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Home Utils. Co., 131 F. Supp. 838, 839 (D. Md. 1955). 
192. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2(b) (2008) (“It is the intent of the legislature 
that . . . the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Federal Courts to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.”); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(d) (McKinney 2004) (“In any such action it shall be 
a complete defense that the act or practice is . . . subject to and complies with the rules 
and regulations of, and the statutes administered by, the federal trade commission.”); 
see also State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. Colo. State Christian Coll. of Church of Inner Power, 
Inc., 346 N.Y.S.2d 482, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1973). 
193. Kirk v. Heppt, 532 F. Supp. 2d 586, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
194. Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Inst. Servs., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 666, 673 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2005) (“The Legislature originally enacted c. 93A to improve the commercial 
relationship between consumers and businessmen.  By requiring proper disclosure of 
relevant information and proscribing unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the Legisla­
ture strove to encourage more equitable behavior in the marketplace.”). 
195. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ellis & Ellis, 262 F.3d 53, 66 (1st Cir. 2001) 
(“[C]h. 93A provides a broad remedy.”); REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK 
STATE  ANTITRUST  LAW OF THE  ANTITRUST  LAW  SECTION OF THE  NEW  YORK  STATE 
BAR  ASSOCIATION, A PROPOSED  NEW  STATE  LAW  MAKING  DECEPTIVE  ACTS OR 
PRACTICES  UNLAWFUL (1968), reprinted in 1968 N.Y. ST. B.A. ANTITRUST L. SYMP. 
114, 129 (1968). 
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3.	 Legal Chaos: Examination of Case Law in the Northeast 
to Determine Competitors’ Rights in Trademark 
Infringement Actions 
As both the plain meaning and legislative intent of the DTPAs 
indicate that corporate competitors have a right to protection, it is 
necessary to evaluate the attendant case law on the topic to deter­
mine whether, if at all, corporate competitors ought to be afforded 
the right to bring trademark infringement actions under these stat­
utes.  Case law from Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York in­
dicates that although there does seem to be a way for corporate 
competitors to make trademark infringement claims under the 
DTPAs, there is a great discrepancy between the various statutes. 
As it stands, each state requires a plaintiff to prove different ele­
ments of a deceptive-trade-practice claim.196 
As opposed to working together harmoniously, the DTPAs of 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York exist in antinomy.  It is 
almost impossible to compare the statutes due to the many different 
judicial interpretations.  For example, the successful trademark in­
fringement plaintiff under New York’s GTFM standard,197 who is 
able to prove that the corporate defendant’s consumer-oriented ac­
tions were so materially misleading that the plaintiff was damaged 
as a result,198 would fail under the same basis in Massachusetts for 
want of the requisite level of “rascality.”199  Similarly, while a suc­
cessful corporate plaintiff in New Jersey may be able to win its 
trademark case by proving it was acting as a consumer in the trans­
action in question and that it suffered an ascertainable loss,200 that 
same action would most certainly fail in New York under the stan­
dard set in Karam Prasad201 for a lack of harm to the public 
interest.202 
The inequities present in the DTPAs of just three states in the 
northeastern United States produce questionable results when at­
tempting to move across state lines.  It is overwhelming to ponder 
196. See supra notes 125-163 and accompanying text.	 R 
197. GTFM, Inc. v. Solid Clothing, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
198. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
199. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1st Cir. 1979). 
200. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2001); Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone 
Card Co., 756 A.2d 636, 637-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000). 
201. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 
2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007). 
202. Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Gucci Am., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 273. 
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what would occur if a large business were to find itself in the unfor­
tunate position of having to bring an infringement action under a 
DTPA in all fifty states due to widespread appropriation of its 
mark.203  To avoid that sort of a situation, the standing require­
ments of DTPA laws must change. 
B.	 Leveling the Playing Field—The Readoption of a True 
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
With NCCUSL’s withdrawal of the UDTPA, the American Bar 
Association’s “goal of creating ‘uniformity in the law of unfair com­
petition among the respective states’ through adoption of a uniform 
state law” has yet to be fulfilled.204  There can be no uniformity in 
the law when an entire class of potential plaintiffs is excluded from 
the possibility of litigation that is solely dependent upon the state in 
which they reside.205  There appears to be no rhyme or reason to 
the DTPAs’ “restricting their coverage to individual consumers.”206 
Consumers, however, are not the only ones affected by deceptive 
trade practices in the marketplace.207  Both large corporations and 
small businesses encounter these legal issues, often due to trade­
mark infringement arising out of false advertising by competing 
commercial venues.  There is a need for consuming businesses and 
corporate competitors alike to have an avenue of recourse in such 
situations.  Perhaps the NCCUSL found the UDTPA to be obsolete 
in 2000, when the economy was booming prior to President Clin­
203. “[Uniform laws] are like the interstate highway system.  The less different 
the rules of the road are from one state to the next, the easier it will be for people to 
travel.”  McDade, supra note 89, at 12.  To continue with the interstate highway anal- R 
ogy, the current DTPAs act as roadblocks and checkpoints, making it incredibly diffi­
cult for the competitor-plaintiff to travel across state lines. 
204. Menell, supra note 98, at 1392 (quoting UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES R 
ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf); see also 
Note, supra note 106, at 1640 (“[P]rotecting and promoting . . . businesses is an impor- R 
tant American policy goal.”). 
205. Some might argue that the DTPAs’ gross exclusion of business entities from 
protection does represent a form of uniformity.  However, the DTPAs are so vastly 
different from state to state that such an argument would not be viable.  Even in states 
where corporate plaintiffs are restricted from bringing suit under the DTPAs, the statu­
tory language that ostracizes those commercial institutions is dissimilar. 
206. Note, supra note 106, at 1626-27. R 
207. An early FTC case exemplifies this concept, noting that “[l]aws are made to 
protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.”  FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U.S. 
112, 116 (1937).  Although business entities may be deemed experts in the field, pur­
portedly transacting at arm’s length, the author acknowledges that this is not always the 
case and believes that “suspicious” corporate competitors are just as worthy of the pro­
tection of the laws as their “trusting” consumer counterparts. 
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ton’s exit from office,208 but in today’s economy, there is a greater 
need to protect our businesses from further financial losses. 
Although it could be argued that large corporations have no 
place in the DTPA framework because of their status as established 
businesses,209 this same bone of contention does not apply to the 
Northeast’s small businesses.  Not all victims of wrongdoing in busi­
ness are consumers—it is all too often the case that small businesses 
are preyed upon by larger, more experienced companies.  In addi­
tion, large corporations are apt to become overwhelmed with legal 
issues regarding the deceptive use of their famous trademarks by 
their similarly situated corporate competitors.  Because of the lack 
of similarity in the DTPAs, it is nearly impossible for a corporation 
in the Northeast to protect itself from potentially devastating at­
tacks of false advertising through trademark infringement and un­
fair trade practices. 
As of 2003, approximately “[t]wenty-one million Americans 
[were] engaged in some kind of entrepreneurial activity.”210  How­
ever, owners and operators of small businesses are often “inexperi­
enced entrepreneurs”211 with little to no business knowledge— 
effectively putting their business entities in the same shoes as the 
“trusting” consumer in the marketplace.212  Due to their lack of ex­
perience in the industry, small businesses may not have the ability 
to transact at arm’s length with their vendors or their customers.213 
Furthermore, unlike large, perhaps famous, corporations, small 
businesses may not have the financial means necessary to litigate 
against a business competitor.214  It is indeed true that “small busi­
nesses are ‘revolutionizing the business of business,’”215 because 
208. Associated Press, Booming Economy of Clinton Years May Cost Bush, 
PRESS ATL. CITY, Dec. 25, 2000, at A9, available at 2000 WLNR 7516503 (“Whatever 
else is said about President Clinton’s stewardship over the past eight years, one fact is 
indisputable: He presided over one of the most remarkable periods of prosperity in the 
nation’s history.”). 
209. Note, supra note 106, at 1627. R 
210. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 61. R 
211. Note, supra note 106, at 1629. R 
212. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. R 
213. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
139, 151-52 (2005) (“[G]iven the importance of small businesses to the American econ­
omy in general, the unavailability of remedial . . . doctrines to such entities may have 
real and significant negative impacts upon economic activity.”). 
214. Note, supra note 106, at 1629. R 
215. Flynn & Slater, supra note 105, at 61 (quoting OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. R 
SMALL  BUS. ADMIN., SMALL  BUSINESS  EXPANSIONS IN  ELECTRONIC  COMMERCE  2 
(2000), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/e_comm2.pdf). 
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the laws must adapt to the emergence of these new “consumers” 
(or, rather, be carried out as they were intended).216 
In an effort to provide a legal remedy to corporate competitors 
across state lines, the NCCUSL must reconvene to discuss a possi­
ble reenactment of the UDTPA217 with the following reforms: (1) 
clear guidelines as to standing requirements for business plaintiffs; 
(2) revised terms for what a competitor-plaintiff must prove in or­
der to succeed on its claim;218 and (3) a final, concise definition of 
what constitutes a “deceptive trade practice.”219  To achieve this 
goal, the NCCUSL might look to several states within the North­
east with viable DTPAs in practice. 
1. Standing Requirements of a Revised UDTPA 
As discussed above, the UDTPA defines a “person” as “an in­
dividual, corporation, government, or governmental subdivision or 
agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, unincorporated as­
sociation, two or more of any of the foregoing having a joint or 
216. In order to accommodate these new “consumers,” the law must recognize 
that “[s]mall businesses are an integral part of the country’s social and economic fabric. 
Americans have long championed the essential role that so-called ‘mom-and-pop’ 
stores play in promoting our society’s basic values and in our economy.”  Chad Mout­
ray, Looking Ahead: Opportunities and Challenges for Entrepreneurship and Small Bus­
iness Owners, 31 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 763, 779 (2009). 
217. Better still, Congress could adopt an across-the-board federal rule on decep­
tive trade practices, as “the need for uniformity is great.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE 
PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 
(1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa 
66.pdf.  In fact, a federal rule would serve the country greatly, since “[t]he sad fate of 
most uniform laws . . . [is that] fewer than half have been fully adopted by more than 20 
jurisdictions.”  McDade, supra note 89, at 13.  The problem with the DTPAs is that they R 
have adopted the UDTPA in piecemeal form.  Professor McDade’s article even goes so 
far as to tout that “[u]niform laws aren’t always uniform or law.” Id. at 12.  Federal 
legislation other than the FTCA concerning deceptive trade practices would be a cor­
nerstone of this area of the law.  However, this seems an unlikely course, since “Con­
gress has not responded to the request for federal uniformity . . . .” UNIF. DECEPTIVE 
TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note. 
218. For example, in order to mount a successful suit against a competitor in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a corporate plaintiff must prove that the corporate 
defendant acted with “rascality.”  Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 
153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (“The objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality 
that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of 
commerce.”).  The “rascality” standard would serve as an excellent addition to a revised 
UDTPA because it would lend some guidance as to the level of deception a defendant 
must rise to in order to be found in violation of the act. 
219. The UDTPA, as it stood at the time of its withdrawal in 2000, did not pro­
vide a succinct definition for “deceptive trade practice.”  Instead, the UDTPA included 
twelve catch-all provisions detailing what kinds of activities might amount to a “decep­
tive trade practice.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2.  
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common interest, or any other legal or commercial entity.”220 
Moreover, the UDTPA incorporates within its provisions a section 
detailing which practices carried out “in the course of . . . business” 
would amount to a deceptive trade practice.221  Included in this sec­
tion is a subsection pertaining to business-disparagement claims, 
which states, in relevant part, that “a person engages in a deceptive 
trade practice when, in the course of . . . business, . . . he . . . dispar­
ages the goods, services, or business of another by false or mislead­
ing representation of fact.”222  The comment on this subsection 
acknowledges that the NCCUSL’s decision to include section 
2(a)(8) of the UDTPA reflected the courts’ growing trend of con­
sidering business disparagement claims.223  When read together, it 
certainly seems that the UDTPA intended to afford protection to 
corporate competitors.  If, under the UDTPA, a “person” can be a 
corporation, and that corporation engages in a deceptive act when 
disparaging the business “of another,”224 it follows that the NC­
CUSL’s inclusion of the “of another” language was for the purpose 
of allowing corporate competitors to bring suit. 
The majority of the states in the Northeast, however, have 
taken a diametric reading of the DTPAs currently enacted, to the 
point of excluding or limiting corporate competitors from bringing 
suit.225  This conflict of opinions relates back to the debate concern­
ing the standing requirements of section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act.226  There, in order to reach a consensus as to the standing re­
quirements necessary to bring suit under the federal act, the courts 
have looked to Congress’s intent in crafting the Act—that is, to 
“exclusively . . . protect the interests of a purely commercial class 
against unscrupulous commercial conduct.”227  Thus, it is evident 
that Congress did not intend to abrogate standing requirements 
from the Lanham Act, despite its broad “any person” language.228 
In the instance of clear congressional intent, it makes sense to limit 
220. Id. § 1(5) (emphasis added). 
221. Id. § 2(a). 
222. Id. § 2(a)(8) (emphasis added). 
223. Id. § 2(a)(8) cmt.  Specifically, the NCCUSL sought to “allow[ ] businessmen 
to enjoin disparagement by competitors . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
224. Put simply, “of another” can be taken to mean another person’s business. 
Or, in the case of the UDTPA’s definition of “person,” another corporation’s business. 
Id. § 1.  
225. See sources cited supra notes 13-14. R 
226. See Apgar, supra note 48, at 2400. R 
227. See Thill, supra note 53, at 377 (quoting Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., R 
Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
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the protections of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act strictly to corpo­
rate competitors.  With regard to the DTPAs, such judge-made law 
does not prove as elementary as the Lanham Act’s standing 
requirements. 
The purpose inherent in the UDTPA was to achieve “uniform­
ity in the law of unfair competition among the respective states.”229 
Although the northeastern states may have adopted the UDTPA in 
whole or in part to serve as their respective DTPAs, the standing 
requirements that are associated with them do not achieve the 
UDTPA’s ultimate goal of uniformity.230  There can be no uniform­
ity in the law when standing requirements have resulted in new leg­
islation from the bench231 that reads in otherwise unneeded criteria 
to the law.  Therefore, it certainly cannot be said that the DTPAs’ 
current standing requirements, which prohibit corporate competi­
tors from bringing suit, are appropriate or even correct.  Prior to 
the enactment of a revised UDTPA, the NCCUSL must issue a pol­
icy statement regarding standing requirements under the Act to 
specifically include corporate competitors within the Act’s reach. 
2.	 Adapting the Requirements Necessary to Bring a 
Successful Claim as a Corporate Competitor 
Under a Revised UDTPA 
In addition to a clear policy statement on standing require­
ments, a revised UDTPA must contain new terms concerning the 
elements a competitor-plaintiff must prove to bring a successful 
claim.  In the prefatory note to the UDTPA, the NCCUSL states 
that the “Act is designed to . . . remov[e] undue restrictions on the 
229. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, 
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985) (citation omitted), available at http://www.law. 
upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
230. “The more states that adopt the exact same law, the more uniformity there 
is.  The more uniformity, the easier it is to work from state to state.”  McDade, supra 
note 89, at 12.  The current DTPAs equate to what could be considered the very antith- R 
esis of uniformity, creating laws that are nearly unnavigable from state to state. 
231. The term “legislating from the bench” has come to be known as a form of 
“judicial activism”—when the court oversteps its bounds to serve as an activist for a 
particular cause. See Bruce G. Peabody, Legislating from the Bench: A Definition and a 
Defense, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185, 207 (2007).  But, “judge[s] should merely 
interpret laws and not make them.”  Press Release, Widener University School of Law, 
Professor Barnett Speaks to Students about Constitutional Clichés (Apr. 25, 2008), 
available at 2008 WLNR 9873528.  That is, the courts are prohibited from “overreaching 
their authority by creating laws or . . . construing laws based on their notions of what is 
best for public policy.”  Katherine Rengel, The Americans with Disabilities Act and In­
ternet Accessibility for the Blind, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 543, 556 
(2008). 
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common law action for deceptive trade practices.”232  Keeping this 
goal in mind, section 2(b) of the UDTPA states that “a complainant 
need not prove competition between the parties or actual confusion 
or misunderstanding”233 in order to succeed upon its claims.  Sec­
tion 3(a) of the act further states that “[p]roof of monetary damage, 
loss of profits, or intent to deceive [on the part of the defendant] is 
not required”234 in order for a plaintiff to receive legal remedy. 
The prefatory note goes on to say that the UDTPA affords a private 
right of action to “persons likely to suffer pecuniary harm . . . .”235 
In effect, through these policy disclosures and the plain language of 
the UDTPA itself, the NCCUSL has significantly lessened the 
plaintiff’s evidentiary burden.  One of the only requirements neces­
sary to bring suit under the UDTPA is that the “person,” or here, 
the corporation, may suffer some form of monetary harm.  It seems 
that the only thing a plaintiff must prove is the “likelihood of public 
deception,”236 which can be mounted through evidence of violation 
of any of the twelve separate categories the UDTPA provides for 
acts of deception.237 
Although the UDTPA plainly states that a plaintiff need only 
prove a possibility of monetary damage as a result of a “likelihood 
of public deception,”238 many of the states of the Northeast have 
contradicted these rather simple rules through judicial decisions 
when dealing with competitor-plaintiffs.  In particular, New Jersey 
requires proof of ascertainable loss.239  New Jersey further states 
that corporate competitors may only be afforded rights under the 
act if they can prove that they “purchase[d] goods and services for 
use in their business operations”;240 Massachusetts requires proof 
232. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, 
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
233. Id. § 2(b). 
234. Id. § 3(a). 
235. Id. prefatory note.  The term “pecuniary” is defined as “[o]f or relating to 
money; monetary.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (9th ed. 2009). 
236. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note. 
237. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. R 
238. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note. 
239. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-19 (West 2001).  Connecticut, a state within the Sec­
ond Circuit, has a similar provision. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b (West 2007). 
Both Connecticut and New Jersey’s requirement of proof of ascertainable loss is in 
clear opposition to section 3(a) of the UDTPA, which states, in relevant part, that 
“[p]roof of monetary damage[ ] [or] loss of profits . . . is not required” in order for a 
plaintiff to succeed on its claim. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a). 
240. Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone Card Co., Inc., 756 A.2d 636, 638 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).  This requirement, although judge-made, is similar to Penn­
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of the defendant’s “rascality”;241 and, finally, New York requires 
proof of actual harm to the public.242 
In a reenactment of a revised UDTPA, it may be worthwhile 
for the NCCUSL to draw from the laws of states where these addi­
tional requirements have worked, such as Massachusetts’s “rascal­
ity” rule.  Conversely, it would behoove the NCCUSL to consider 
making a policy statement against the extraneous requirements of 
both New York and New Jersey, since they serve only to limit the 
plaintiff pool in deceptive trade practices actions.243 
New York’s DTPA, General Business Law section 349, allows 
corporate competitors to bring suit only in extremely limited cir­
cumstances because of its requirement of actual harm to the public. 
Although the New York statute purports to allow “any person”244 
to bring suit, the “public interest requirement” virtually excludes 
nearly all potential corporate claims for want of being able to prove 
actual harm.245  Despite this “public interest” requirement, no­
where in the text of section 349 is a requirement of “public harm” 
sylvania’s statutory requirement that only transactions in which goods purchased for 
“personal, family, or household” uses are protected under the state DTPA.  73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2008); see Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 445-46 
(Pa. 2001); see also World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. 
Supp. 2d 413, 446 (W.D. Pa. 2003).  The wording of this statute negates the possibility of 
corporate action. See infra notes 260-265 and accompanying text. R 
241. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A §§ 2, 11 (2008); see Damon v. Sun Co., 87 F.3d 
1467, 1483 n.8 (1st Cir. 1996); Atl. Cement Co. v. S. Shore Bank, 730 F.2d 831, 834 (1st 
Cir. 1984); Spence v. Boston Edison Co., 459 N.E.2d 80, 88 (Mass. 1983); Atkinson v. 
Rosenthal, 598 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992); Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, 
Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). 
242. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004).  New York’s requirement of 
actual harm to the public runs afoul of the UDTPA’s policy statement that a plaintiff 
need only prove a “likelihood of public deception.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRAC­
TICES ACT prefatory note. 
243. Opponents to such a course of action may argue that considerations of judi­
cial economy are at play when courts choose to specifically limit a relative plaintiff pool 
to a certain class of individuals or entities.  Judicial economy relates to the “[e]fficiency 
in the operation of the courts and the judicial system . . . [and] the efficient management 
of litigation so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s 
time and resources.” BLACK’S  LAW  DICTIONARY 923 (9th ed. 2009).  Eliminating a 
party’s right to be heard deprecates fairness and encroaches upon rights established by 
the Constitution.  Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 280 (1876) (asserting that the right 
to be heard is one that is “founded in the first principles of natural justice”).  The au­
thor argues that the avoidance of trampling upon the rights of American citizens will 
defeat any compelling interests in judicial economy. 
244. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h). 
245. “[T]he gravamen of the complaint must be consumer injury or harm to the 
public interest.”  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 273 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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touched upon or mentioned.246  The lack of any plain language in 
the statute concerning the concept of “public harm” leads to the 
conclusion that it is a standard that has been prudentially read into 
New York’s DTPA.247  In contrast, even a brief reading of the 
UDTPA reveals that a plaintiff need not prove an element of public 
harm.248  Under the requirements of the UDTPA, a plaintiff need 
only prove a “likelihood of public deception,”249 or, in the case of 
New York’s statute, a likelihood of public harm.250  There is a vast 
difference between a likelihood of harm and actual harm.251 
Additionally, New York’s standard of “public harm” necessa­
rily requires that the courts differentiate between “harm to a busi­
ness as opposed to [harm to] the public at large.”252  Such a 
requirement forces the court to decide on a case-by-case basis what 
qualifies as substantially a business harm and what qualifies as sub­
stantially a public harm.  Moreover, courts often will decide that the 
“gravamen”253 of the competitor-plaintiff’s claim is harm to his bus­
iness without realizing that harm to a business and harm to the pub­
lic interest are not mutually exclusive.254  Proving otherwise is 
246. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349. 
247. Genesco Entm’t v. Koch, 593 F. Supp. 743, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (concluding 
that a commercial claim is not within the ambit of section 349 “[d]espite the absence of 
controlling New York precedent”). But cf. Constr. Tech., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 704 F. 
Supp. 1212, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Inquiry in [section 349] cases thus need focus only 
on whether deception was practiced, not on any separate public interest question.  And 
either the consumer or an injured competitor may sue.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
248. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT § 3 (amended 1966, withdrawn 
2000), 7A U.L.A. 289-90 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
249. Id. 
250. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349; see also Securitron Magnalock Corp. v. 
Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 1995) (“‘[C]orporate competitors now have stand­
ing to bring a claim under this [statute] . . . so long as some harm to the public at large is 
at issue.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 
786 F. Supp. 182, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1992))). 
251. “Actual” is defined as “existing in act and not merely potentially.” MER­
RIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 13 (11th ed. 2005).  Compare this with the 
definition of “likelihood,” which is taken to mean “probability,” id. at 721, which in 
turn is defined as “something (as an event or circumstance) that is probable,” id. at 989. 
An act that is probable is “supported by evidence strong enough to establish presump­
tion but not proof.” Id. 
252. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 277 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
253. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 
2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007). 
254. In an interview with Robert C. Hinkley of the law firm Jones Day, Hinkley 
suggested that corporations can operate without “damag[ing] the public interest in the 
pursuit of profits.”  Chris Luis, People v. Profits: A False Dichotomy?, 5 U.C. DAVIS 
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difficult—it is only with formal economics or business training that 
one can accurately predict what effects harm to a business will have 
on the public.255 
It is too burdensome, and simply unfair, to subject competitor-
plaintiffs to a standard that requires sophisticated training and an­
ticipation of unpredictable (or unforeseeable) effects.  As discussed 
above, in the case of small businesses, most entrepreneurs are 
young and inexperienced—further, they are new to the industry.256 
Without a high level of business expertise, it would be nearly im­
possible for such a plaintiff to sufficiently plead “public harm” 
under such stringent circumstances.  For these reasons, it is impera­
tive that the NCCUSL disregard such requirements in a redrafting 
of the UDTPA.  New York’s interpretation of the law defeats the 
NCCUSL’s original purpose as stated in the UDTPA’s prefatory 
note: “to . . . remov[e] undue restrictions on . . . action[s] for decep­
tive trade practices.”257 
Along the same lines, the DTPA in states like New Jersey car­
ries with it a requirement that is not within the plain language of 
the UDTPA.  In 1971, New Jersey’s DTPA was legislatively ex­
panded to afford a right of action to “[a]ny person who suffers any 
ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal.”258  Such 
a requirement is nowhere to be found within the regulations of the 
UDTPA, and, in fact, section 3(a) of the UDTPA explicitly states 
that “[p]roof of monetary damage [or] loss of profits . . . is not re-
BUS. L.J. 6 (2004), available at http://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-5-no-1/People-v­
Profits-A-False-Dichotomy.html.  Hinkley goes on to state that people have long as­
sumed that the connection between business and public harm was “mutually exclusive.” 
Id.  Hinkley asserts that “[t]hey are not, and the sooner we realize this, the better off 
mankind will be.” Id. 
255. “[T]he higher the level of education of the entrepreneur, the higher the level 
of performance of the venture—whether measured as growth, profits, or earnings 
power of the entrepreneur.”  Mark Weaver, Entrepreneurship and Education: What Is 
Known and Not Known About the Links Between Education and Entrepreneurial Activ­
ity, in THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY 113, 117 (2006), available at http://www.sba.gov/ 
advo/research/sbe_06_ch05.pdf. 
256. See generally Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & 
Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 
100-01. 
257. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, 
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
258. N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:8-19 (West 2001); see also Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht 
Sales, Inc., 541 A.2d 1063, 1067 (N.J. 1988).  The word “ascertain” is a transitive verb 
defined as “to find out or learn with certainty.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 71 (11th ed. 2005).  That being the case, logic demands that the term “as­
certainable loss” be associated with certain loss, or, more commonly, actual loss. 
589 
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quired” in order for a plaintiff to receive remedy under the act.259 
Although the New Jersey legislature was attempting to further ex­
pand the possible plaintiff pool under the DTPA with the addition 
of this language, in terms of the UDTPA, New Jersey did the oppo­
site, foreclosing the avenue of litigation to competitor-plaintiffs un­
able to prove an ascertainable loss. 
New Jersey supports businesses that use the DTPA.  This much 
was made clear in Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Shuster Corp., 
a case that involved a dispute over computer parts between two 
corporate entities.260  There, the court stated that 
[b]usiness entities, like individual consumers, cover a wide range. 
Some are poor, some wealthy; some are naive, some sophisti­
cated; some are required to submit, some are able to dominate. 
Even the most world-wise business entity can be inexperienced 
and uninformed in a given consumer transaction.  Unlawful prac­
tices thus can victimize business entities as well as individual con­
sumers.  It may well be, of course, that certain practices unlawful 
in a sale of personal goods to an individual consumer would not 
be held unlawful in a transaction between particular business en­
tities; the Act largely permits the meaning of ‘unlawful practice’ 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  But to exclude busi­
ness entities from any protection of the Act would contravene its 
manifest purpose as well as its unambiguous language.261 
Although this statement by the court seems to afford great le­
niency to business plaintiffs as far as protection under the New 
Jersey DTPA, in reality, it only serves to limit corporate competi­
tors to claims involving the “sale of personal goods.”262 
Such an interpretation precludes New Jersey’s corporate com­
petitors from bringing suit under the New Jersey DTPA for any of 
the deceptive trade practices affecting businesses that are clearly 
delineated under the UDTPA.  In New Jersey, corporate competi­
tors can only sue under the DTPA when they are considered con­
sumers, in the literal sense of the word.263  In a revised version of 
259. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a). 
260. Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 515 A.2d 246, 247 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). 
261. Id. at 249 (citations omitted). 
262. Id.  The New Jersey DTPA has been construed “to afford protection to cor­
porate and commercial entities who purchase goods and services for use in their busi­
ness operations.”  Arc Networks, Inc. v. Gold Phone Card Co., 756 A.2d 636, 638 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000). 
263. Arc Networks, Inc., 756 A.2d at 638 (“[T]he Act has been interpreted to 
afford protection to corporate and commercial entities who purchase goods and ser­
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the UDTPA, it would be advisable to mention that although New 
Jersey’s method seems to be a fair reading of the DTPA, it is not 
fair to limit corporate competitors to suits that are not in concert 
with the full spectrum of the UDTPA’s purpose.  The UDTPA’s 
original purpose was to offer “remedy to persons likely to suffer 
pecuniary harm for conduct involving either misleading identifica­
tion of business or goods or false or deceptive advertis[ement].”264 
Considering that deceptive trade practice actions originated from 
common-law actions for trademark infringement,265 this sort of lim­
itation is largely inappropriate. 
Comparatively, the Massachusetts DTPA affords equal rights 
to both consumers and corporations alike.266  By 1986, the Massa­
chusetts legislature had amended chapter 93A such that section 11 
provided a plausible cause of action for business plaintiffs.267  In 
contrast to other DTPAs of the Northeast, the Massachusetts 
DTPA is a viable statute in terms of providing guidance for a revi­
sion of the UDTPA.  Massachusetts law requires that the plaintiff 
prove that the defendant acted with a degree of “rascality” in the 
business scenario at hand.268  This requirement demands that the 
vices for use in their business operations.”).  This sounds of Pennsylvania’s UTP/CPL, 
where private actions are restricted to “person[s] who purchase[ ] or lease[ ] goods or 
services primarily for personal, family or household purposes.”  73 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 201-9.2 (West 2008).  Due to this limitation, corporate competitors in the Com­
monwealth of Pennsylvania may only bring suit if they themselves are acting in the 
capacity of consumers. See Weinberg v. Sun Co., 777 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Pa. 2001); see 
also World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 
446 (W.D. Pa. 2003).  Competitors wishing to bring unfair competition claims must rely 
upon “the Attorney General and district attorneys to bring actions in the name of the 
Commonwealth,” thus negating a private right of action for the competitor-plaintiff. 
Granite State Ins. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 57 F.3d 316, 320 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995). 
264. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note (amended 1966, 
withdrawn 2000), 7A U.L.A. 266 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
265. Id. 
266. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A §§ 2, 11 (2008). 
267. Franke & Ballam, supra note 105, at 383. R 
268. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1979). Contra Mass. Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 435, 438 
(Mass. 1995) (“We view as uninstructive phrases such as ‘level of rascality’ and ‘rancid 
flavor of unfairness’ in deciding questions of unfairness under G.L. c. 93A.  We focus on 
the nature of the challenged conduct and on the purpose and effect of that conduct as 
the crucial factors in making a G.L. c. 93A determination.” (citations omitted)).  The 
First Circuit Court of Appeals sought to clarify the Propac-Mass language: 
The [plaintiffs] argue that . . . the SJC abandoned the “rascality test” in stating
 
that it “view[s] as uninstructive phrases such as ‘level of rascality’ and ‘rancid
 
flavor of unfairness.’”  Contrary to the [plaintiffs’] interpretation, the SJC was
 
simply recognizing that the mentioned phrases do not, despite their frequent
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defendant’s “objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality 
that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and 
tumble of the world of commerce.”269  To determine what kinds of 
behavior rise to the level of rascality the Massachusetts DTPA re­
fers to, it is necessary to look to earlier cases interpreting section 11. 
These cases indicate that to act with a sufficient level of rascality, 
one’s acts must be within a “recognized conception of unfair­
ness.”270  Further, these acts must be “immoral, unethical, oppres­
sive [or] unscrupulous”271 and of the kind that “would . . . cause 
substantial injury to consumers, competitors or other 
businessmen.”272 
Although the UDTPA specifically provides in section 3(a) that 
“[p]roof of . . . intent to deceive is not required” for a plaintiff to 
succeed on its claims,273 the Massachusetts rascality requirement 
does not necessarily speak to a requirement of intent.  It is wholly 
possible for a defendant to act “immoral[ly], unethical[ly], oppres­
sive[ly] . . . unscrupulous[ly]”274 without the intent of doing so.275 
In fact, this concept is likely the reason why the UDTPA does not 
carry an intent requirement.  Rather, the Massachusetts require­
ment addresses the level of deception necessary for a defendant to 
be found in violation of the DTPA.  This standard would be a sound 
addition to a revised UDTPA simply because it would provide 
some amount of guidance as to the degree of the deception neces­
sary for a corporate defendant to be found in violation of the act. 
citation, lend much guidance in the fact-specific context of a chapter 93A 
claim. 
Damon v. Sun Co., 87 F.3d 1467, 1483 n.8 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
269. Levings, 396 N.E.2d at 153. 
270. PMP Assocs. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1975). 
271. Id. 
272. Id. 
273. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (amended 1966, withdrawn 
2000), 7A U.L.A. 289-90 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
274. PMP Assocs., 321 N.E.2d at 918. 
275. The American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law has spoken to this 
effect, stating that 
a party can be found to have committed a deceptive practice, including false 
advertising, under the FTC Act, the Lanham Act, and/or most state consumer 
protection statutes . . . without intending to make a false representation, with­
out knowing its representation to be false, with good faith in the truth of the 
claim, and without actually having deceived any particular consumer or num­
ber of consumers. 
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, CONSUMER PROTECTION HANDBOOK 5 (2004). 
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3.	 The Final Word: The Definition of “Deceptive Trade 
Practice” 
The term “deceptive trade practice” is not defined in the Lan­
ham Act,276 the FTCA,277 the UDTPA,278 or any of the DTPAs of 
the northeastern United States.279  In 1983, however, the FTC is­
sued a Policy Statement on Deception, under which deception 
would be found if “a representation, omission or practice is likely to 
mislead consumers” who are presumed by the FTC to be “acting 
reasonably in the circumstances.”280  Further, the deceptive prac­
tices “must be . . . material.”281  Despite what seemed to be a clear-
cut definition of the term, Congress did not amend the FTCA to 
include that definition within its provisions.282  Although this ambi­
guity may have been intentional, there remains a way to provide a 
firm definition for the term while still leaving the floodgates open 
to the multitude of present and future violations. 
In a revision of the UDTPA, the NCCUSL would be prudent 
to allow the FTC’s definition of “deceptive trade practice” to sup­
plement the current twelve-part UDTPA list of possibly deceptive 
acts283 and simply change it to address the acts listed within the 
UDTPA.284  But, the FTC’s definition285 must be changed to reflect 
that the deceptive act or practice is likely to mislead any “per­
son,”286 as opposed to only “consumers.”  According to Black’s 
Law Dictionary, a consumer is defined as “[a] person who buys 
goods or services for personal, family, or household use, with no 
intention of resale; a natural person who uses products for personal 
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072 (2006). 
277. Id. § 41. 
278. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 265. 
279. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110a (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, 
§ 2531 (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 1 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 1211 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 (West 
2001); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-2 
(West 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS  §§ 6-13.1-1 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2451a (2006). 
280. Letter from James C. Miller III, FTC Chairman, to John D. Dingell, Chair of 
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983) [hereinafter Miller Letter], re­
printed in In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174-84 (1984), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
281. Id. 
282. See id. 
283. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2.  
284. Id. § 1.  
285. See Miller Letter, supra note 280.	 R 
286. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting UDTPA’s definition of a R 
“person”). 
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rather than business purposes.”287  The UDTPA is written such that 
it affords a private right of action to corporate competitors—to in­
clude the word “consumers” in a definition of “deceptive trade 
practice” would undermine that very provision of the act.  Accord­
ingly, the NCCUSL should adopt the following language to provide 
a clear definition of the term deceptive trade practice: a deceptive 
trade practice is a representation, omission, practice, or act that is 
likely to mislead a person in a material way, despite the presumption 
of that person’s reasonable actions under the circumstances.288  This 
new definition would not supplant the original UDTPA’s definition; 
rather, it would support it by negating confusion as to what exactly 
constitutes a “deceptive trade practice” in the future. 
C.	 Allowing the DTPAs to Address the Purpose for Which They 
Were Created—Unfair Competition Through Trademark 
Infringement 
The DTPAs all have one trait in common—the federal and 
model acts out of which they were born all carry the goal of ban­
ning deceptive practices considered detrimental to competitors’ 
businesses.289  Even after the FTC was granted the power to protect 
consumers,290 Congress drafted the language of the FTCA such that 
the act would serve as prohibitive of “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”291  The fact that, for this al­
leged consumer protection provision, Congress chose language that 
is indicative of a relation to business competition speaks volumes as 
287.	 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 358 (9th ed. 2009). 
288. The applicable statutes and case law inspired this author-written definition. 
For example, the part of the definition specifying “reasonable actions under the circum­
stances” came from the FTCA’s “reasonable consumer” standard.  Lemley, supra note 
26, at 318.  The word “consumer” was removed from the FTCA standard in order to R 
both reflect the fact that the vast majority of the DTPAs cite plaintiffs as “any person” 
(i.e., both consumers and corporations), and also to reflect the UDTPA’s less stringent 
statutory requirements, such that corporate plaintiffs would be able to bring suit with­
out any ambiguity. See Clinton, supra note 123, at 387-88.  The language concerning R 
being materially misled was lifted partially from New York’s DTPA. N.Y. GEN. BUS. 
LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004); Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2003).  Fi­
nally, the phrase “representation, omission, practice, or act” was borrowed from the 
language of the most prominent sections of the UDTPA. UNIF. DECEPTIVE  TRADE 
PRACTICES ACT, 7A U.L.A. 265. 
289.	 See Scheuerman, supra note 77, at 11. R 
290.	 Id. at 12. 
291. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Mize, supra note 78, R 
at 656.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the phrase “affecting commerce” is de­
fined as “touching or concerning business, industry, or trade.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION­
ARY 65 (9th ed. 2009). 
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to the drafters’ intent.  This being the case, Congress likely did not 
intend to close the door on business protection in its pursuit to af­
ford consumers a private right of action for deceptive trade prac­
tices.292  This conclusion is further evidenced by one of the reasons 
cited for the creation of the UDTPA—the need to stop “[d]eceptive 
conduct constituting unreasonable interference with another’s pro­
motion and conduct of business.”293 
In recognizing that the UDTPA addresses unfair competition 
methods that arguably could be covered by either the FTCA or the 
Lanham Act,294 one question is begged: why do the majority of the 
DTPAs295 fail to recognize that trademark infringement296 is a valid 
cause of action?297  As noted above, the courts of New York have 
292. At its core, a deceptive trade practice action can be said to be loosely framed 
around an action for trademark infringement.  The vast majority of deceptive trade 
practices claims center on the act of “passing off,” or the “imitation of . . . marks . . . 
which had developed trade significance.” Id.  The UDTPA recognizes that most decep­
tive trade practice actions are born out of disputes of or relating to trademark matters 
and divides deceptive conduct into two classes—those “involving . . . misleading trade 
identification” and those involving “false or deceptive advertising.” UNIF. DECEPTIVE 
TRADE  PRACTICES  ACT prefatory note.  As a clear-cut rule concerning infringement 
suits brought under the state’s DTPA is currently debated in New York, see Karam 
Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 27, 2007), the majority of this section will focus on the differences in opinion in 
that state. 
293. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note. 
294. Dole, supra note 11, at 486 (explaining that the UDTPA strictly forbade the R 
substitution of goods, trademark infringement, false designations of origin, false adver­
tising, disparagement, bait-and-switch advertising, pricing fraud, as well as conduct 
tending to create confusion, misrepresentations, and misunderstandings). 
295. The DTPAs are in theory (but perhaps not in practice) the statutory off­
spring of a model act meant to bring “uniformity [to] the law of unfair competition.” 
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT prefatory note. 
296. Professor McCarthy notes that a finding of trademark infringement hinges 
upon the public’s likelihood of confusion.  1 MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 2:8.  He goes R 
on to state that “trademark infringement is a type of unfair competition.” Id. § 2.7. 
In many factual situations, the same result is reached whether the legal wrong
 
is called trademark infringement or unfair competition.  In such cases the
 
courts often lump them together and speak of them as identical concepts.  To­
day, the keystone of that portion of unfair competition law which relates to
 
trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the
 
buying public.  Whatever route one travels, whether by trademark infringe­
ment or unfair competition, the signs give direction to the same enquiry—
 
whether defendant’s acts are likely to cause confusion.
 
Id. § 2.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
297. One can only assume that New York law correlates trademark infringement 
actions brought under DTPAs with business harm as opposed to consumer harm.  How­
ever, one commentator recently asserted the following: “[T]he aim [of trademark] is to 
provide consistency for the consumer who has previously purchased and been satisfied 
by a product bearing the mark XYZ.  When another firm labels its product as XYZ, the 
595 
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not yet reached a consensus as to the status of the state’s DTPA 
trademark infringement actions brought by corporate competi­
tors.298  The prevailing opinion in New York is that trademark ac­
tions brought by competitor-plaintiffs arising under the DTPA 
generally fail to allege a sufficient level of harm to the public inter­
est.299  Moreover, “trademark infringement actions alleging only 
general consumer confusion do not” rise to the level of harm to the 
public interest required to bring a successful motion under the 
state’s DTPA.300 
When one looks to an analogous area of the law—the issuance 
of injunctions in trademark infringement actions—it seems as if 
New York’s stance on the issue of harm to the public interest is way 
off the mark.  When considering whether to issue an injunction in a 
trademark infringement action, the courts use a four-factor test to 
determine whether such relief is appropriate.301  Part of this test 
provides that the court must evaluate whether the defendant’s in­
fringement of the plaintiff’s mark will harm “the public interest.”302 
In discussing the public-interest factor in relation to the issuance of 
injunctions, district courts have acknowledged that “[i]nfringement 
of a trademark is inherently contrary to the public interest.”303 
The Third Circuit has previously ruled that the public interest, 
when viewed through the prism of trademark litigation, should be 
considered “a synonym for the right of the public not to be 
deceived or confused.”304  As injunctions are the most common 
real damage is to the consumer . . . .”  Ryan McLeod, iBrief, Injunction Junction: Re­
membering the Proper Function and Form of Equitable Relief in Trademark Law, 2006 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0013, ¶ 19 (2006),  http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/ 
articles/pdf/2006DLTR0013.pdf (emphases added). 
298. Karam Prasad, LLC v. Cache, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 5785 (PAC), 2007 WL 
2438396, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (noting an intracircuit split). 
299. Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 5150, 
1997 WL 137443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997). 
300. Id.; see N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004). 
301. Prior to issuing a remedial injunction, the courts must consider whether “(1) 
[the] plaintiff prevailed on the merits of its claim; (2) [the] plaintiff would suffer irrepa­
rable harm absent injunctive relief; (3) the harm to the plaintiff would outweigh any 
harm to [the] defendant; and (4) the injunction [will] adversely affect the public inter­
est.”  Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1999) (citing A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
302. Id. 
303. Connelly v. ValueVision Media, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (D. Minn. 
2005). 
304. Optician’s Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 197 (3d 
Cir. 1990); see also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 
(7th Cir. 1976) (“A ‘trademark’ is not that which is infringed. What is infringed is the 
right of the public to be free of confusion . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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form of relief under both the UDTPA and the DTPAs,305 it follows 
that the same terms that apply to the issuance of an injunction in a 
common-law trademark-infringement action—that trademark in­
fringement is contrary to the public interest—ought to be included 
in the requirements of an action for trademark infringement under 
a DTPA.306 
New York’s stance on the matter of harm to the public interest 
is diametrically opposed to the regulations set forth in the UDTPA. 
In contrast to the New York statute,307 the UDTPA proscribes de­
ceptive conduct that will “create[ ] a likelihood of confusion or of 
misunderstanding.”308  If consumer confusion is a sufficient basis 
for bringing an action under the UDTPA, how can the State of New 
York claim that under its DTPA, consumer confusion is simply not 
enough?309 
Similarly, with the surrounding circuits asserting that trade­
mark infringement is indeed contrary to the public interest, how 
can judicial interpretations of New York’s DTPA claim otherwise? 
As stated in a recent law review article, “For a law with the purpose 
of protecting the public, the actual consideration of the public’s in­
terest . . . would seem necessary.”310 
The “keystone”311 here is the public’s likelihood of confusion. 
New York’s DTPA is missing this keystone, and the competitor­
plaintiff’s option to bring forth a trademark action has crumbled 
entirely due to a faulty interpretation of the law.  The DTPAs were 
crafted such that competitors and consumers alike could bring suit 
for deceptive acts.  To strip one class of plaintiffs of its rights to 
bring what ought to be the most common form of action under the 
DTPA’s tenets—trademark infringement—is inherently unfair. 
305. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 3(a) (amended 1966, withdrawn 
2000), 7A U.L.A. 289-90 (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ 
fnact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.pdf. 
306. The author is of the opinion that the courts ought to allow larger, more fi­
nancially stable corporations to act as the “‘vicarious’ avenger of consumer rights,” 
such that the voice of the “trusting” consumer can be heard.  Camel Hair & Cashmere 
Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1986). 
307. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2004). 
308. UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2(a)(12). 
309. See Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 
5150, 1997 WL 137443, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997). 
310. McLeod, supra note 297, ¶ 25. R 
311. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 64, § 2:8 (“[T]he keystone of that portion of unfair R 
competition law which relates to trademarks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confu­
sion in the minds of the buying public.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the impossible puzzle that has been made of corpo­
rate rights under the various DTPAs, now is not a good time to be a 
competitor-plaintiff that needs to litigate in more than one state. 
With judicial interpretations of the DTPAs that virtually eliminate 
any chance that a competitor-plaintiff may have had to win its case, 
businesses, both small and large, will have to resign to the fact that 
they will not be able to fully litigate their claims in a court of law 
unless the DTPAs undergo an overhaul.  The missing piece to this 
puzzle, the competitor-plaintiff’s last bastion of hope, rests with the 
UDTPA, which was withdrawn in the year 2000 due to its alleged 
obsolescence.312 
The cases that deny standing to corporate competitors seeking 
to bring trademark infringement actions under DTPAs have erred 
on the wrong side of the law.  How can a system that has put forth 
laws to protect its citizens against unfair and deceptive trade prac­
tices reconcile the assertion that consumer confusion, which is the 
basis of deceptive trade practice theory, does not rise to the level of 
importance necessary to warrant being a public interest?  If any­
thing, consumer confusion is the hallmark of a dysfunctional system 
at odds with its legislative goals. 
Through examination of the actual language of the DTPAs, it 
becomes clear that the majority of these statutes do not seek to 
exclude corporate competitors from bringing suit.  In fact, in most 
cases, their very language encourages such legal action.  Judicial in­
terpretation of these statutes has created confusion—where one 
competitor-plaintiff may succeed on its claims, another may fail 
simply for crossing another state’s border.  It simply cannot be the 
case that the states desire this sort of confusion and inequality be­
tween their laws, especially when such a viable alternative exists. 
The legislative purpose of the DTPAs, to protect consumers 
through the maintenance of a competitive marketplace,313 would 
best be served by the adoption of a revised UDTPA.  The UDTPA 
is a champion of trademark law and recognizes that immeasurable 
value is attached to each product’s individual mark.  Trademark 
functions to inform the public, and, in this time of economic uncer­
tainty, we as a nation need the stability that trademark can offer the 
marketplace more than ever.  If the states wish to have any sort of 
312. Menell, supra note 98, at 1392. R 
313. Lily Transp. Corp. v. Royal Institutional Servs., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 666, 673 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
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uniformity among their laws, or even a functioning free market, 
they must be willing to take another chance on the UDTPA. 
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